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Abstract 
  
This study aimed to identify how the perception of user alerts is supported by design 
instructions and standards, examine possible and realized risks associated with losing 
situational awareness regarding alerts, and report cybersecurity issues related to user 
interaction and poor design in situations requiring special attention in the cyber physical 
environment. 
 
This thesis was a qualitative study combining empirical and theoretical research strategies. 
The empirical part was carried out by examining investigation reports published by traffic 
management authorities in the context of deficient situation awareness. The theoretical part 
was accomplished by a literature review focused on situation awareness, risks related to it 
and means to foster it.  
 
The results show that in a single accident, multiple errors in situation awareness and at 
different system interfaces can occur simultaneously. Situational awareness was found to 
be often weakened by the problems in perception.  Human-software interactions, as well as 
human-to-human interactions are vulnerable to multitudinous errors. Furthermore, it was 
found that the risk of vulnerability increases with the complex and inter-connected ICT 
systems being as targets for cyberattacks. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The loss of situational awareness might lead to severe accidents. On 24th July 
2013, the derailment of a high-speed train caused 80 deaths and 152 injuries in 
Spain. The accident was a result of a loss of situation awareness of the engine 
driver, caused by misinformation of the speed due to configuration and 
compatibility problems on the information and management systems. (Fernandez 
et al. 2017.) 
As shown above, there can be multiple factors contributing to the loss of situation 
awareness. In this study, a multi-disciplinary approach to situation awareness and 
alarm functionalities is applied in order to highlight issues related to human 
computer interaction (HCI) and cybersecurity in the fields of communication and 
information system sciences and information engineering (IE). Thus, based on this 
framework, the loss of situation awareness is reviewed from a system perspective  
that emphasizes interactions between the system components. The SHELL-model, 
developed by Edwards in 1972 and depicted in Figure 1 below, demonstrates the 
overall interactions in the cyber world. The model was originally designed for 
aviation and it implies that there is not necessarily a sole cause for accidents (Perry 
and Perezgonzales 2010).  
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Figure 1. Interaction model (paraphrased SHELL-model from Aviation Knowledge 2010, 2013 and 
Skybrary 2019.) 
The SHELL model represents human factors (Perezgonzales 2009) which as a 
multi-disciplinary approach views people in working situations, their relationship 
with machines (software and hardware) and surrounding environment, as well as 
their relationships with other people (liveware). The re-engineering of physical and 
social environments is essential in human factors approach to respond properly to 
functional requirements and to acknowledge the capabilities and limitations of the 
human operators. Thus, the practices concerning the implementation of human-
technical interfaces and technical designs are emphasized in the discipline of  
human factors through the concept of ergonomics. (Perezgonzales 2013.) 
The SHELL model can be used as a basic aid to understand human errors in 
interactions between system components. Errors can take form at the liveware-
software interface as misinterpretations if symbols, checklists or documents are 
considered confusing, ambiguous or irrational. An example of this mismatch is the 
death of passengers and crew in 1980 in a flight cargo fire when it took too long to 
find and follow the instructions on how to respond to a smoke alarm. Similarly, 
liveware-hardware interface can suffer from deficit equipment design or defectively 
coded control devices such as warning systems that fail to alert. This was a factor 
in 1974, when a flight crew ignored a terrain warning alarm, which caused the plane 
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to crash. The alarm was simply regarded as a nuisance. In the case of liveware-
environment interface, errors can occur in human perception or be caused by 
biased decision making. As an example of the former is a plane crash in 1985 
caused by communication difficulties due to high ambient noise levels in the 
cockpit. Finally, liveware-liveware errors concern communication between human 
individuals and can take form as communication breakdowns, for example, 
between the flight crew and the air traffic controller. (Perry 2010.) 
Regarding the aforementioned system perspective, the socio-technical system 
approach includes people, equipment, technology, hardware, software, data, and 
procedures as system components and focuses on their interactions (Charitoudi 
and Blyth 2012). This system approach is applicable for understanding the impact 
of the loss of situation awareness on organizations. Complexity increases as the 
world becomes more connected with the cyber environment evolution exposing  
new system vulnerabilities, so cybersecurity needs to be viewed holistically from 
the lens of systems thinking (Salim and Madnick 2016). The holistic approach 
considers security problems as simultaneous errors in the interrelationships 
between users and technologies and the social and technical components (Mujinga 
et al. 2017).  
According to the Cyber Security Glossary published by the Security Committee 
2018, cybersecurity refers to the security of a digital and networked society or 
organization and its impact on their operations. Cybersecurity is a target state of 
the cyber environment where it can be trusted and protected, and where security 
risks are under control. Cyber environments are, for example, ICT-based 
transportation and logistics systems, traffic control systems, and plant control 
systems. In the cyber environment, vulnerabilities that enable or can be used to 
cause harm, malfunction or danger can exist in information systems, processes, 
and human activities. (Vocabulary Center TSK, 2018.) 
The loss of situation awareness can be viewed as implications or appearances of 
human factors and cybersecurity. The objectives, research method and research 
questions of this study are introduced in the following chapters. This introduction 
part introduced the nature of situation awareness as a research subject, 
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emphasized its significance and described the scientific framework. The concept 
and model of situation awareness, as well as ergonomic, environmental and 
information system aspects are introduced in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes 
issues in the design of situation awareness systems. Chapter 4 presents a concept 
of false alarms and examines risks that potentially compromise situation 
awareness related to human factors and cybersecurity. Situation awareness in 
different domains is reviewed in Chapter 5 which presents the survey results based 
on a content analysis of incident reports. Finally, conclusions are made in Chapter 
6, and the reliability, validity and effectiveness of this study is estimated. Topics for 
further research are recommended in Chapter 6 as well.   
 
 Objectives of the study 
The aim of this study is to investigate how situational awareness systems can 
implement situational awareness through visual usability in user informing taking 
into consideration the risks associated with the reliability, integrity and availability 
of situation information by means of an user interface and impact of this information 
on user decision making. Here, situation information focuses on alarms, which are 
signals of abnormal or dangerous events. A parallel term is alerts, which includes 
warnings, cautions, instructions, messages and communications requiring 
immediate attention and action by the user (Yeh et al. 2016). A derived theoretical 
research assumption is that a malicious attacker, by triggering unnecessary or 
false alarms, or otherwise influencing to alarm data, causes alert fatigue, which 
leads to loss of situational awareness.  
This study does not discuss the relationship between situation awareness and 
situation assessment, nor does it review the functions of orientation, decision 
making or action, beyond observation roughly (“OODA” loop). Out of the scope is 
also examination of various user interfaces (such as graphical, voice control, 
haptic, and multimodal) or detailed design guidance for them. Furthermore, this 
thesis does not describe in any detail the anatomy of the human senses (such as 
touch, taste, smell) in the perception of alerts, or knowledge management or alarm 
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management. Situation awareness models and related cognitive processes are not 
compared. Here, unraveling or analysing exact attack techniques and 
vulnerabilities is not included because identifying them and their impact is 
considered to be sufficient. The means to rectify and improve defective systems, 
solutions, circumstances or working conditions (e.g. control rooms) are not studied, 
but proposals are made in this respect for further research. This study particularly 
aims to determine whether false alarms compromise situation awareness, and 
therefore, validation would be best done in a study using a possible practical case. 
As the system environments become more diverse, and the amount of information 
available increases, the use and number of integrated situation awareness 
systems will increase. In this context, it is important to bring up the debate on the 
risks of use and design tools that can reduce the cognitive burden on the user from 
the perspective of information flooding, detection and decision making. This study 
aims to provide more information and understanding, because serious defects in 
situation awareness can literally cause planes to drop from the sky, or trains to 
derail, or plants to malfunction, or even patients to die. The following Figure 
attempts to explain some main elements of the entity of this study. 
 
Figure 2. The elements describing the scope of the study 
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Based on a literature review, previous studies and the research text samples, this 
study seeks to determine what principles, standards, and guidelines can be used 
to ensure a user-friendly and safe interface, and what abnormalities or incidents,  
such as information security events or alert fatigue, occur in socio-technical 
systems including situation awareness systems that compromise cybersecurity in 
the context of alarm functionalities. 
 
 Research method   
This study applies qualitative research methods combining empirical and 
theoretical research strategies. The aim of empirical research is to study the 
characteristics, types and themes of an existing phenomenon by directly examining 
the phenomenon or by using related material (Koppa 2010). Theoretical research, 
on the other hand, does not immediately observe the research objects, but seeks 
to outline conceptual models, explanations and structures based on earlier 
research literature (Koppa 2010). 
 
In this study, the focus of the empirical part was on examining the investigation 
reports published by traffic management authorities in the context of deficient 
situation awareness. The theoretical part was accomplished by the means of 
literature review focused on situation awareness, risks related to it and means to 
foster it. This aimed to provide comprehensive information on the quality, 
properties and aspects of situation awareness and form a conception of the whole, 
as defined by the principles of qualitative research (Koppa 2015).  
 
Herein, the hermeneutical method, being typical for qualitative research (Koppa 
2018), is fruitful in producing interpretations of situation awareness, as well as 
means and risks related to it. Results of this study were produced by reviewing 
relationships between subjects around situation awareness in order to gain 
expanding understanding of it.  
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In the framework of this study, it is considered important that one must first 
understand situation awareness as a phenomenon, and then determine how the 
perception of alerts is supported by design instructions and standards in general. 
After that, the possible and realized risks associated with losing situational 
awareness can be examined. Finally, conclusions can be made to summarize the 
findings.  
 
However, while presenting subjective interpretations, as is typical of hermeneutical 
research, new interpretations can emerge. This may, in turn, produce opposite 
interpretations, novel applications, and new research themes to gain a better 
understanding of the original phenomenon. Definitive results are not necessarily 
produced, as they depend on momentary interpretations of the researcher. (The 
Helsinki Term Bank for the Arts and Sciences 2016.) 
 
What follows from what is described above, is that the results of one study can 
diverge from the results of another, when survey and conclusions are made by 
another researcher. Thereby, this study represents only one kind of viewpoint on 
situation awareness loss.  
 
1.2.1 Information retrieval 
The objective of the study required that information about safety incidents in 
transportation and communication was collected and analysed, and literature of 
situation awareness as a phenomenon was studied. The support available for 
users on the perception of alerts and cybersecurity issues related to user 
interaction was studied by reviewing design instructions and standards.  
 
The material selected for analysis was already collected and published material 
related to the research subject, the so-called secondary data. In this thesis, the 
qualitative analysis of the connections between phenomena was based on a 
hermeneutic analysis and on a close reading (Koppa, 2009). The contents of the 
research material were summarized, structured, integrated and assembled in order 
to answer the research questions (Saaranen-Kauppinen and Puusniekka 2006).  
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Such material, that was current, actual, and relevant, openly accessible, and thus 
no more than ten years old, was selected for this study. However, it must be noticed 
that substantive theories of situation awareness by Mica Endsley date from the late 
1980s onwards, and some safety related models date back to the 1970s. The 
source material for the theoretical background consisted of literature and previous 
publications that discuss the concept of situation awareness, influencing human 
factors and risks related to perception. The study material included interface design 
standards, style guides and guidelines for alarm functionalities, as well as 
investigation reports and vulnerability findings on alert functionality related 
incidents. In particular, the Public Transport Agency's public reports on rail and 
fairway safety incident reports, the Maritime Accident Analysis, Traficom’s 
published aviation accident statistics, investigation reports by Accident 
Investigation Board Norway and the US National Transportation Safety Board's 
Accident Reports on Aviation, Marine and Railroads are used.  
 
As presented in Table 1 below, reports of serious accidents were searched from 
various databases with such keywords as "situation awareness", "situational 
awareness", "false alerts", "false alarms", "failure to monitor", "monitor problem", 
“warn” and “wrong al”. Fault categories such as “the human-machine interaction” 
were used if possible. This was done in order to gain an understanding of the 
effects of the loss of situational awareness and factors that had led to an erroneous 
view of a situation. Relevant reports were selected if they were published between 
2010 and 2020.  
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Table 1. Information search  
 
 Research questions 
The main research question was “What are the risks in the user interaction of 
situation awareness systems with relation to alarm functionalities?” Further, the 
main question was divided to sub-questions as follows:  
1. What aspects of cybersecurity are present in user interaction in the 
operating environments of situation awareness systems with relation to 
alarm functionalities? 
a. What information can be found in literature about situation awareness 
and supporting it in situational awareness systems? 
b. How are alarm functionalities supported and implemented as a part 
of situation awareness in situation awareness systems by design 
guidelines? 
2. What are the effects of losing situational awareness? 
a. Are safety incidents or accidents related to the loss of situation 
awareness appropriately reported? 
b. Based on the accident reports, what are the main reasons for losing 
situation awareness in relation to alarm functionalities? 
3. What factors can potentially compromise situational information in the 
context of alarm functionalities? 
a. What human factors can influence situation awareness? 
b. What kinds of cyber threats can compromise situation awareness? 
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The first task in this study was to gather information on the aspects of cybersecurity 
related to user interaction in the operating environments of situation awareness 
systems. The purpose was to examine the audio-visual language that provides 
user information in alarm functionalities of situation awareness systems and its 
effect on the cognitive load experienced by the user in perception based on 
guidelines, standards, and style guides. Also, the learning objective was to 
determine how user perception is supported through user interface design in 
situations requiring special attention and consider the likelihood for 
misrepresentation or misinterpretation of information. 
 
The second task was to investigate the effects of the loss of situational awareness 
by examining reports and statistics on air, sea, and rail accidents. The information 
was obtained from public sources by utilizing investigation reports from Finland, 
Norway, and U.S. The result content of selected reports was classified by type of 
deviation, cause (creator) and consequence (effect) through interpretation. 
 
The third task was to explore factors that may compromise situational information. 
The availability of accurate situational information is considered necessary to gain 
a correct understanding of a particular situation in a cyber environment. This 
exploration was accomplished by reviewing security incident and vulnerability 
reports and previous studies of human perception.  
 
In this study, the alarm functionality is seen as illustrated in Figure 3:  
 
Figure 3. Alarm Functionality in a Situation Awareness System (Lal 2013, paraphrased.)  
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2 SITUATION AWARENESS 
Situation awareness is a description or understanding of the current situation, its 
underlying factors, and possible alternatives to its development (General Finnish 
Ontology YSO 2020), and is formed by the perception of environmental elements 
(Crane and French in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2017). According to 
much citated Endsley’s (1999) model presented in Figure 4 below, situation 
awareness involves three levels: perception as an awareness of environmental 
factors, comprehension as an understanding of the meaning of what was perceived 
(recognizing, interpreting and evaluating the significance) and projection as an 
ability to predict the situation in the near future (based on perceiving and 
understanding the dynamic elements of the environment).   
 
Figure 4. Situation awareness (Endsley 1999, originally 1995)  
 
The relevant human cognitive functions for situational awareness must be 
recognised in order to perform a specific task or job required, as well as ensure 
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that the working environment is suitable for the task´s requirements. To achieve 
situation awareness, the abilities of sensation and perception must be facilitated 
so that one can, for example, hear (auditory perception) and see (visual perception) 
warning signals or discern alert symbols on the monitor or display. An ability of 
attention must be realized to focus on the perceived information, for example, in a 
control room where a supervisor monitors changes in the situation. Working in the 
environments, such as control or command centers, is complex and dynamic by 
nature due to constant changes in the perceptual environment. People must react 
rapidly and make decisions under the pressure of time, as e.g. air traffic controllers 
are required to do. Situation awareness will have to be complete and accurate. 
(Kalakoski 2016.) 
The aforementioned human cognitive functions are parts of the cognitive 
processes which can be categorised from lower order thinking skills to higher order 
thinking skills (Revised Bloom’s Taxonomy by Iowa State University of Science and 
Technology). The lowest skill is recollection which comprises remembering, 
recognizing and recalling and can be concretized in situation awareness e.g. by 
recognizing the current state of matters. The next skill in the hierarchy is 
understanding which comprises interpreting and classifying and can be 
concretized, for example, as in necessity to understand the alert priority in a 
situation awareness system. The skill of understanding is followed by application 
comprising execution and implementation, for instance when carrying out an 
immediate remedial action triggered by an alert. Proceeding further on the 
hierarchy, analyzation encompasses focusing and organizing and refers to e.g. 
selecting the most suitable procedures in a given situation. The next skill is 
evaluation which comprises checking and critiquing and refers to, for example, 
judgment made on the basis of action results and efficiency in an alert situation. 
The highest skill in this hierarchy is creation which encompasses generating and 
planning and refers to e.g. hypothesizing and constructing an updated mental 
model of the current situation as a whole. (Iowa State University of Science and 
Technology 2020.) 
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As a human cognitive process, processing of information when adjusting 
orientation to a situation proceeds from observation and direction of attention to 
structuring of information, and further to direction of activities, and finally to 
motivation (Timonen 2013). Figure 5 describes the cycle of information processing 
and the factors, objects, properties, starting points and conditions of related sub-
processes.  
 
 
Figure 5. Information processing on situation orientation (Timonen 2013, paraphrased) 
 
In the cognitive processes, according to semiotician C.S. Pierce, there are three 
levels of reality experience e.g. phenomenological categories (Figure 6), firstness, 
secondness and thirdness. Firstness refers to immediate experience without 
interpretation. Secondness relates to experience that arises when a perception is 
reacted to or interpreted in the light of previous experience. Thirdness signifies 
experience formed through logical reasoning and analysis. (Koponen et al. 2016.) 
A German philosopher Edmund Husserl described time as a tripartite structure 
consisting of protention, the now-point, and retention. Protention is the  anticipation 
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of the future constraining the various expectations constituting and conditioning of 
which is coming. Retention refers to the chain formed of the past and the reflections 
of previous phenomena kept in consciousness. Husserl stated that time-
consciousness provides the organizing basis for all other activities of 
consciousness. (Dainton in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2017.) 
 
 
Figure 6. Combined depiction of situation awareness (Endsley, Kalakoski and Pierce, 
paraphrased)  
 
As described above, Pierce’s model offers a theoretical basis for sign functioning. 
It represents a triadic relationship between a sign or representamen (a first), an 
object (a second) and an interpretant (a third) (Everaert-Desmedt 2013). Based on 
this, an alarm message is an indexical spatio-temporal sign of something being not 
right, presented usually as a symbol (legisign), and demanding understanding, 
interpretation and action from the observer.  
Perception involves sensing and filtering stimuli by directing attention. Stimuli 
received by sensory organs and successfully filtered by the brain are subject to 
interpretation so that their significance in each situation can be assessed. An 
individual light, sound signal, or symbol acquires its operational content through 
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interpretation. The interpretation is based on the models in memory about the 
corresponding stimuli and their meaning. Through successful interpretation, insight 
arises. (Safety Investigation Authority 2004.) 
Symbols as signs are visual elements that describe their object in the simplest way 
through the "this is X" relation. The symbol can be merely figurative, i.e. iconic, or 
contractual, i.e. symbolic, and tells only what it is and to which category this object 
belongs. Information can also be conveyed as glyphs, which means a pattern that 
describes, in addition to its classifying or qualitative meaning, quantitative or other 
information related to an object in some form. Thus, the glyph is multidimensional, 
but a symbol can also be considered as such if it represents (encodes) quantitative 
or other information whose meaning consists in the interrelationships of its parts. 
(Koponen et al. 2016.) 
Regarding visuality, it has been estimated that the visual sense transmits 
information eight times more to the brain than all other senses combined, i.e. circa 
10 Mb/s. Although the exact amount of information cannot be directly measured, it 
has been found that the fastest way to acquire new information is to have it in visual 
form. Visual perception is particularly pronounced in the interpretation of glyphic 
features (such as higher bar, larger sphere). In this visual reading, at the 
elementary level the value of a single data point is read (e.g., the length of a single 
bar), at the general level the whole pattern is read (e.g., the bar graph trend), and 
at the intermediate level answers to specific questions are searched (e.g., a 
comparison of trends for selected time periods described in the time series). 
(Koponen et al. 2016.) 
This chapter has provided a brief summary of the theoretical background relating 
to situation awareness through the aspect of cognitive processes. In the following 
sub-chapters, the concepts of cognitive and information ergonomics are 
introduced, as well as the applications of situation awareness.  
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 Cognitive ergonomics 
Cognitive ergonomics focuses on the interaction between a human and a 
technological system. It applies scientifical principles of human cognitive functions, 
e.g. perception, attention, data processing, decision making, and motivation. The 
areas of application include the design and evaluation of equipment, work 
processes, systems and environments. Methods in the field of cognitive 
ergonomics are also applied in accident investigation. The aim of cognitive 
ergonomics is to promote fluency and safety by reducing operational risks. 
(Haavisto 2006.) 
Haavisto (2006) argues that for some reason, when designing systems, there is a 
tendency to assume that human errors can be eliminated by adding technical 
systems and automating functions. However, it is natural for a human to make 
mistakes -  this can never be fully eliminated. Nevertheless, the number of mistakes 
and the severity of their consequences can be reduced by adding safeguards 
between the operator and the system. The knowledge of a person´s natural 
behaviour can prevent accidents caused merely by one touch of a button. Second, 
the tasks can be designed in such a way that the technology supports the person 
in performing the work, i.e. by providing sufficient information in a suitable form that 
allows a formation of an understanding of the work process. The mere exterior 
design of a user interface with a fancy appearance is not sufficient, but one must 
also need to know how a person forms an understanding based on knowledge. 
(Haavisto 2006.) 
Particularly in security-critical environments, where operations are controlled on 
the basis of large amounts of complex data, overly automated systems have been 
found to degrade the quality of human decisions. However, individual warning 
systems and the automation of sub-functions when the load is high facilitates  
human activities. Still, if the job includes solely the control of an automatic process 
where devices instruct the person on what should be done next, decision-making 
is impaired. A person cannot use the accumulated knowledge gained through work 
and education to make complex decisions, instead, an automation system guides 
him to an overly straightforward decision. Thus, excessive job automation can 
20 
 
cause ignorance on what is going on in the work process. Many systems do not 
even operate according to human logic of thinking, but according to computational 
principles, in which case they actually entice a person to make mistakes. (Haavisto 
2006.) 
For example, an air traffic controller must be constantly provided with sufficient and 
easily understandable information on aircraft speeds, altitudes and directions in 
order to be able to form an overall picture of the situation and to anticipate future 
situations. The actions should not be directed by user interfaces, but the person. 
(Haavisto 2006.) 
The field of cognitive ergonomics has generally developed rapidly, and methods of 
the field have been used in the design of nuclear power plant work processes and 
interfaces, in research and development of military environments, in aeronautics 
research and development, and in health care, especially in anaesthesia and 
safety. In Finland, the utilization of cognitive ergonomics expertise in increasing 
fluency and safety has so far been limited. (Haavisto 2006.)  
Visual usability is an important element of cognitive ergonomics. The productivity 
of work is reduced if data are presented in an inappropriate form or have to be 
extracted from a varying or vague field of observation. When attention is paid to 
visual usability, performance and effectiveness of a worker is accelerated. The 
speed of data reception and processing can be multiplied by the clear display and 
correct layout of information. Also, in terms of visual usability, the placement of the 
information, i.e. layout, display and lighting, resolution, font size, colour and 
darkness variations is an important factor. The visualization of datasets helps to 
better understand the data and its significance, especially if the datasets are large 
and complex. (Lähdeniemi 2013.) 
 
 Work and information ergonomics 
Franssila et al. (2014) define work ergonomics as a field of specialization that 
studies the phenomena and processes related to processing and management of 
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information and in complete information work environments. Information 
ergonomics aims at balancing an employee's cognitive abilities with the demands 
of the information environment. Above all, information ergonomics develops and 
adjusts everyday work practices and the overall information environment of work. 
Information ergonomics seeks to maintain and increase performance through 
information workload management practices, tools, and development techniques, 
while maintaining the information workload at a manageable level. (Franssila et al. 
2014.) 
Information ergonomics is reflected through information design i.e. the structuring 
of information into a format that is best suited for human use. Information should 
be presented in a clear way and it should follow two key principles: the comparison 
and simplification of content. The comparison concerns the interrelationships of 
matters and situations (e.g., normal mode vs. exceptional mode) and presupposes 
a consistent use of symbols, scales, and colours. The simplification of content 
means that only the information with the greatest significance is described. The 
physical design should aim to improve the discoverability of information, while the 
cognitive design should ensure the understandability of information and, finally,  
the affective design should allow for the emotional aspect of information. The latter 
ensures what emotions are triggered, for example, by an alarm signal and how it 
directs a person to correctly position oneself and act on them. (Koponen et al. 
2017.) 
Situational information must also be authentic, non-repudiable, intact and available 
so that to it can be trusted. It also should be timely, comprehensive and complete 
(Blasch 2012). Another requirement for situational information is the distinctiveness 
of information i.e. the observability of a message stimulus which affects human 
performance as the first factor in perception (Lähdeniemi 2013). Thus, receiving a 
stimulus is the first critical step in data processing (Lähdeniemi 2013). When the 
stimulus intensity is sufficient, the actual perceptual experience begins to take 
shape (Lähdeniemi 2013). 
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 Control rooms 
Work and information ergonomics are essential in control rooms. A control room 
represents a cyber-physical environment requiring special attention in order to 
ensure situation awareness. A control room can serve as a command center for 
controlling e.g. processes, operations, systems, equipment or networks.  
Information security operations centre (ISOC) is an example of a control room and 
a command center. The Vocabulary of Cyber Security defines ISOC as an 
organization or part of an organization that creates, monitors and analyses the 
information security situation and status, prevents, identifies and analyses security 
breaches, documents them and responds to them in accordance with the 
guidelines. (Vocabulary Center TSK 2018.) 
For example, the design of an air traffic controller's work station is substantial to 
the safe and efficient operation of the control room. Factors that affect safety 
include sound vs. noise, lightning and illumination, equipment, software design, 
readability of radar screens, ease of use of controls and efficiency of 
communications equipment. Successful controller working position constrains the 
integration of operational, technical and human factors expertise. (Skybrary 2018.) 
A common room space can promote team-level situational awareness. When 
spaces are carefully planned, the productivity of operations can be improved, for 
example, by facilitating the sharing of situation information, and ideas and 
communication in general by placing actors and operators close together, which 
speeds up the exchange of information (Lähdeniemi 2013). Also, considering the 
significance of the sense of sight in the acquisition of new knowledge (Koponen et 
al. 2016), it is easy to understand the positioning and layout of the wide display 
screens in control rooms.  
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3 SITUATION AWARENESS INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
A situation awareness system can be considered as any system that supports its 
user's situational awareness by visualizing relevant situational information for user 
perception and action. Nowadays, situation awareness systems can be equipped 
with real-time information fusion from different sources, enable basic data analysis 
and recognition, and allow for the presentation of the corresponding data using 
augmented reality principles (Fernandez et al. 2017). Extensive situation 
awareness systems can offer advanced decision support and analytics capabilities 
in addition to providing observation data. While situation awareness is a mental 
state, does situation assessment support it with the help of information fusion. Such 
applications are especially used in the military, medical, aviation, security, and 
environmental domains in order to synthesize manifold data into a single operating 
picture (Blasch et al. 2006). The situation awareness system should support all 
three levels of situational awareness, i.e. perception (detection), comprehension 
(understanding) and projection (predicting) (Koistinen 2011). 
The aspect of this study regarding information systems is described with some 
examples in Figure 7. A situation awareness information system is viewed from the 
perspective of a user interface and an implementation of visualisation where 
interaction and information design have an impact on user interaction. User 
interaction is considered through the situational and user factors associated with 
perception, which expose operations to errors and may cause hazards. The cyber 
environment is viewed from the perspective of information and operational security 
events that have significance or consequences for the information displayed and 
the sources of alarms. These events may include security incidents, such as those 
caused by incorrect configuration of alarm sources and display errors, and may 
present a risk or hazard of use. 
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Figure 7. Sub-systems 
 
This study aims to provide understanding how the safe use of a situation 
awareness system in the context of alarm functionality is supported through system 
design in a cyber environment. The cyber environment refers to the parallel 
concept of the cyber world, which refers to the totality of information networks and 
devices, information systems and their users, platforms and operating processes 
for processing information in digital form (Lehto 2019). 
 
Based on the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI), the structure 
of the cyber world can be described as a five-tier network model in which the 
semantic layer consists of information and data content in user and operator 
systems and management of user-controlled functions. The cognitive layer of this 
network model describes the problem-solving and interpreting environment of 
decision-maker, operator, and individual user information, a world in which 
information is interpreted and personal situational awareness is formed. (Lehto  
2019.) 
 
Each situation awareness system must have a balance between security, 
functionality, and user experience as shown in Figure 8. Inappropriate system 
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implementations weaken this balance and create an operating environment 
vulnerability. (Lehto 2019, paraphrased.) 
 
Figure 8. System Solution Priorities (Lehto 2019, paraphrased.) 
 
Alarm functionality is implemented in graphical user interfaces according to the 
principles, standards and guidelines of alarm management. According to user 
experience architect Raj Lal (2013), user interaction implementation answers three 
questions: what does the user interface look like (visuality), how it is understood 
(cognition) and how it works (interaction). In case of deficiency in cybersecurity, a 
user can receive false information or operate in an impolitic manner based on 
information visualized in user interface. Malicious security breaches can per se 
lead to unsafe and dangerous actions.  
 
The user interface design of information systems utilizes style guides, guidance 
from authorities and community operators, as well as standards, to ensure that the 
system functions appropriately for its intended use and is safe to use. Previous 
research has shown that a poor user interface design of systems and devices has 
led to serious incidents. This study highlights the risks associated with user-driven 
system alarm functionality.  
 
User interaction design must address the needs of multiple user groups in a variety 
of environments, such as a protective clothing user with multiple display 
technologies in isolation mode. As systems and devices utilizing sensor technology 
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increase, more alarm functionality is produced, which can make the user tired of 
repetitive alarms (Gaba et al. 2013). Noise levels may be high, for example, in a 
hospital setting and may exceed the permitted guidelines.  
As previously described, generic primary tasks of situation awareness consist of 
cognitive tasks, such as monitoring and detection, situation assessment, response 
planning and response implementation. Monitoring and detection, in turn, consists 
of activities involved in extracting information from the environment. For example, 
in current process systems these tasks are supported through various 
heterogeneous sensors and appropriate signal-processing methods, that are used 
to extract as much information as possible about the dynamic environment. 
(Naderpour et al. 2015, referring to O’Hara et al. 2011.) 
Regarding the information extraction from environment, mentioned last in the 
previous paragraph, data fusion techniques are utilized. Data fusion refers to 
combining information (physical, informational or perceptual) to estimate or predict 
the status or mode of certain aspect of the environment (Steinberg et al. 1999). 
This information is presented in terms of attributive and relational states in these 
multi-source information systems, which provide data processing and control 
functions, several interfaces and associated data bases (Steinberg et al. 1999). 
Furthermore, to clarify the difference between data fusion and data mining, the first 
one aims to real-time detection of known patterns, whereas the latter concentrates 
on off-line discovery of new patterns (Llinas et al. 2004.). 
Multi-source information systems cannot provide complete information solely by 
fused data from sensors or computer models, but there is a need for information 
originated by human expertise and knowledge also. Unobserved aspects cannot 
either be processed by a computer, so user knowledge and reasoning is necessary 
to be enabled. Thus, information systems should have properties of a reasoning 
system and enable control and review procedures, so that it could respond to user 
demands by the following features: 
- knowledge acquisition procedures  
- explicit representation of multi-sensor knowledge 
- quantitative indicators of properties of fusion results  
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- intuitive, understandable displays of properties  
- interactive techniques to improve the quality of fusion results 
- logical rules to facilitate the acquisition and explicit representation of 
knowledge  
- calculus of evidence to provide a mechanism to model sensor evidence and 
uncertain knowledge  
- explanations about the fusion processes to permit quantification of the 
relevance of various knowledge items and the detection and identification 
of contradictions while enabling consideration of alternative hypotheses  
- graphical displays to facilitate understanding of inferential chains and their 
conclusions  
- interactive control and review mechanisms to permit humans to correct 
arguments to increase the utility of conclusion and fusion results. (Blasch et 
al. 2006) 
Fusion models can be used for evaluation and deployment of a multi-source sensor 
fusion system, as Figure 9 depicts. The User Fusion model (in the left) can be 
applied together with the Data Fusion Information Group’s model (in the right). The 
user carries out an assessment of the situation by a mental model, which is a 
representation of the world as aggregated through the data gathering, information 
fusion design, and the user’s perception of the situation. Situation assessment in 
level 2 includes tacit functions which are inferred from level 1 explicit 
representations of object assessment. (Blasch et al. 2006.) 
 
Figure 9. Fusion models for sensor fusion systems (Blasch et al. 2006) 
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In Figure 9, the level zero represents data estimation and prediction in object state 
observation on the basis of a signal or pixel. At the first level object assessment is 
done by estimating and predicting the entity states from associated data. The 
second level concerns estimation and prediction of relations among entities. At the 
third level estimation and prediction of effects on situations of planned or estimated 
actions is executed, including performance evaluation. The fourth level is about 
adaptive data acquisition and processing to support sensing objectives (e.g. sensor 
management, information systems dissemination). At the fifth level adaptive data 
retrieval, visualisation and display to support cognitive decision making and actions 
in the human computer interface is carried out. Finally, adaptive determination of 
spatial-temporal control of assets, route planning and goal determination is put into 
practice to support team decision making and actions. (Blasch et al. 2006.) 
Fernandez et al. (2017) argue, that in the fields of situation awareness and alarm 
management, there is a growing need for integrated goal-oriented supervisory 
systems, platforms and frameworks, as described above.  Prevention of accidents, 
like in Spain 2013 mentioned in the introduction, demands higher-level semantic 
cognitive activities, integration of both context and historical knowledge, learning 
capabilities and solid decision support from systems. In order to function correctly 
and fulfil the requirements of safety, security and emergency monitoring, integrated 
timestamped data fusion techniques, data semantic analysis, alarms and events 
statistics, and expert rules knowledge have to be applied in system solutions. 
System solutions must also be aware of context and content, meaning and 
relevance. Fernandez et al. (2017) faced a challenge to develop an advanced 
supervisory system supporting higher-level cognitive activities by presenting a 
novel cognitive architecture for Critical Situation Awareness Systems. In this 
particular situation awareness architecture, the Associated Reality as a new 
cognitive layer is significant in improving the perception, understanding and 
prediction. The role of the Associated Reality as a co-pilot or a personal assistant 
is emphasized, when modelling related information of the system and its 
environment for enhancing the alarms and events management. In this situation 
awareness system architecture for railway safety, depicted in Figure 10, has the 
Data Fusion Information Model been applied. (Fernandez et al. 2017.) 
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Figure 10. System architecture for railway safety (Fernandez et al. 2017) 
 
The Figure represents an example of a train safety application, where the 
corresponding historical Associated Reality cognitive layer and the involved 
timestamped database consists of sensors (e.g. thermometer, GPS, odometer, 
tachometer, gyroscope, Doppler radar) and information related to them (e.g. GSM 
and GPRS data, command and control information, railway incidents information, 
and 4G LTE external cloud information or extended 5G connections and 
associated cloud services). Alarms and events management consists of the rules 
database, which can be modified by the corresponding command and control cloud 
service. Triggered alarms are timestamped and stored in the historical alarms and 
events database. The speed constraints are defined by this database based on 
weather conditions and distance intervals, and a simplified alarm rule to for 
registration could be like the following one: 
 
Picture 1 Alarm rule (Fernandez et al. 2017) 
 
As an advantage in this kind of associative situation awareness architecture is that 
e.g. train speed and position can be estimated in multiple direct or indirect ways 
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which improves reliability of the alarm system. This provides robustness and 
capability to response to various scenarios, even then when a sensor system is 
partially damaged or degraded. (Fernandez et al. 2017.) 
To summarize this, in situation awareness information systems a goal-oriented 
associated reality cognitive layer performs tasks of a co-pilot with the help of 
modelized, combined and stored information from multiples sources. Information 
contains system characteristics, state, mode and context, semantic information 
and historical data, models, and simulation and estimation methods. This kind of 
systems are based on extracting relevant data and drawing inferences and 
conclusions, when perceived, analysed and associated information about the 
system and its environment improves constantly the knowledge and decision 
making. This leads to better observability, controllability and situation awareness. 
(Fernandez et al. 2017.) 
 
 Supporting situation awareness by standards, style guides and design 
instructions 
This sub-chapter of the study aims to some extent bring out the features of 
appropriate and safe implementation of the alarm functionality in information 
systems. Here, the main design principle is consistency, which concerns beyond a 
single visualisation a greater number of Figures, colours, pictograms, symbols and 
other elements. All elements belonging to the same entity should be used 
consistently in visualizations, and presentation itself should be consistent across 
the screen. Finally, all forms presented should convey relevant information. 
(Koponen et al. 2016.) 
There are three factors that affect to object findability through visual search: (1) the 
occurrence of the object, i.e. the visual features that our visual observation 
specializes in recognizing, (2) attention focusing, i.e. sensitizing our visual 
perception to specific targets, and (3) familiarity with the core features of the view 
(scene gist), i.e., ease of identification compared to strangers. These factors are 
utilized in alarm functionalities. For example, a flashing light, or a triangular warning 
sign with strong colours and colour contrast (red, black-yellow) makes a person to 
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notice it when appearing to the field of vision, even though this person is not 
actively looking for such a stimulus. (Koponen et al. 2016.) 
Pictograms and ideograms are used to visualize alerts, alarms and warnings. The 
former is a stylized image of a material object (e.g., a device or room) and its state 
of affairs (status: not working), while the latter describes a set of values, prompt, or 
other functional aspect (e.g., leak alarm, take the following actions). A symbol is 
an ideogram when it connects two or more things together. Symbols can be (1) 
locative, i.e. indicating the place of occurrence, (2) instrumental, i.e. indicating the 
activity or event by an instrument used therein (e.g. indication of a maintenance 
claim with an image of a wrench), or (3) objects, i.e. referring to content (e.g. logo, 
ID). Standards - such as e.g. ISO7000 and IEC60417 - guide the use of these 
marks in hardware and software. (Koponen et al. 2016.) 
In the domain of nuclear plant safety, Human-System Interface Design Review 
Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3) provides guidance for evaluation of the 
physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces. These 
guidelines address the basic elements – such as information displays – i.e. building 
blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. The guidelines also 
consider reviewing of the sub-systems  - like alarm system, safety parameter 
display system, group-view display system, computer-based procedure system, 
automation system, and communication system. NUREG-0700 document presents 
high-level human-system interface design review principles, which support the 
operating personnel’s primary task of monitoring, controlling, recognition, tolerance 
and recovery from human errors. These principles are divided into four categories: 
general principles, primary task design, secondary task control, and task support. 
General principles (1) aim to verify, among other things, that the design is 
compatible with the general cognitive and physiological capabilities, such as 
support for visual and auditory perception.  Primary Task Design principles (2) seek 
to ensure the operator’s primary task of process monitoring, decision making and 
control to maintain safe operation. This includes maintaining of situation 
awareness, as the information presented to the users should be correct, 
recognizable in an instant, and easily understood (e.g., “direct perception” or 
“status-at-a-glance” displays) and support the higher level goal of user awareness 
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of the status of the system. Secondary Task Control principles (3) target to 
minimize secondary tasks, such as  activities associated with navigation through 
displays or accessing data, which can detract personnel from performing the 
primary tasks. This has much to do with cognitive workload management by 
minimizing e.g. making of mental calculations, transformations or use of recall 
memory. For example, recalling lengthy lists of codes, complex command strings, 
information from one display to another, or lengthy action sequences should be 
avoided. Information presented by the system should be rapidly recognized and 
understood, and therefore, raw data should be processed and presented in directly 
usable and accessible form. Task Support principles (4) strive to, among other 
things, mitigation of errors by the fail-safe design. Error tolerance and control 
should be refined so, that it covers the situation of a failure damaging equipment, 
injuring personnel or operating inadvertently critical equipment. A user error should 
not have serious consequences, thus, the negative effects of errors should be 
controlled and minimized. The system should offer simple, comprehensible 
notification of the error and simple, effective methods for recovery. (U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission 2012.) 
In aviation, there are guidance such as the Minimum Operational Performance 
Standards for Aircraft Surveillance Applications System (RTCA DO-317B 2014) 
and Airworthiness Approval for Systems and Applications (FAA AC 20-172B). 
Designing safe system solutions, it is also recommendable to take into 
consideration accessibility issues and user disabilities, if possible. For example, 
Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0 and the user-oriented design 
system Color Universal Design (CUD) can be utilized in this.  
In interactive system design, it is desirable to be aware of common expectations 
about colour codes. According to western colour conventions, red signifies danger, 
yellow caution, green safety, whereas grey or white or blue neutrality. Warm 
colours represent action or response required, whilst cool colours represent status 
or background information. Colours are used for achieving greater information 
density and colour alterations can be applied to indicate status changes. Visibility, 
observability and familiarity contributes to attention drawing to alarms, alerts and 
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warnings. Ensuring visibility and observability of elements helps users to perceive 
what functions are available and what the system is currently doing. Familiarity is 
realized through known terms and recognizable symbols. (Benyon 2011.) 
 
3.1.1 Alerts and alarms  
An alert is attentive by nature, i.e. it exists for notifying of something. It serves as 
an indication of change and thus, a status annunciator. A typical example of an 
alert is a warning or an error message. An alarm, in turn, can be characterized as 
summoning, when urging to do something (e.g. requiring operator action) to the 
abnormal situation. According to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (2012) 
definition, alarms are generated, when conditions or events are expected to occur 
but do not, or when an alarm is expected but it does not occur. However, the terms 
are used often interchangeably for each other. In the following paragraphs, some 
common design instructions for alerts and alarms are presented.  
Standards, such as ANSI/ISA-18.2-2009, EEMUA 191, and NAMUR NA 102 are 
for the improvement of alarm management, claiming that an effective alarm system 
delivers the right alarm to the operator at the right time with the right importance 
and the right information. Basic principles are the following: (1) every alarm should 
have a defined response, (2) each alarm should alert, inform, and guide, and (3) 
each alarm presented to the operator should be useful and relevant. There are 
multiple advanced alarming techniques e.g. for managing of alarm rates, for 
modifying alarm behaviour and shelving or suppressing alarms. (Fialkowki 2012.) 
There are commercial software products on the market for alarm management  
with features like dynamic alarming. Dynamic alarming refers to techniques for 
modifying alarm attributes and eliminating alarms floods in planned and in 
unplanned events, aiming to provide an optimum alarm configuration in plant 
environments. An alarm flood is defined as such condition, that during which alarm 
rate exceeds the rate the operator can effectively manage. If the rate is more than 
10 alarms per 10 minutes, the risk of missing a critical alarm increases. As a 
feature, dynamic alarming with automatic modification or suppression, will come in 
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handy in multiple alarms situations resulting from an equipment malfunction or 
process abnormality. (Emerson 2019.) 
Considering the message visualisation in systems, Jakob Nielsen (2001), the 
famous usability expert, instructs design of error messages by pointing out the 
following issues:  
- message visibility and high noticeability (both of the message itself and how 
it indicates which dialogue element users must repair) 
- multiple encoding mechanisms and redundant cues, instead of e.g. using 
only a colour to indicate an error 
- explicit and comprehensive indication of all error situations (relates to alarm 
management) 
- human-readable language, instead of obscure codes or abbreviations (e.g. 
"an error of type 0987 has occurred") 
- precise description of the exact problem, instead of vague generalities (e.g. 
"syntax error") 
- congruous and constructive advice on how to solve the problem or situation, 
instead of leaving user and activity as blank.  
The issues Nielsen pointed out are taken into account in these following 
recommendations for alert design in user interfaces as well (Zlatkus 2019):   
- producing the minimum content for an alert with a title, a description, and a 
primary and a secondary action button 
- placing the alert in the middle of the screen or display to ensure maximum 
attention 
- placing the messages near where problem arose. However, placed in a 
consistent position on the bottom of a screen is sufficient near to and not 
obscuring relevant information. 
- background dimming as for highlighting an alert modal to put emotional 
weight and significance to it 
- avoiding the generic – and confusing – naming of the buttons, but using a 
button name following the message title (i.e. descripting the function) 
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- putting weight to primary buttons by positive colours (negative are red, 
yellow and orange), and colouring secondary buttons in grey (a “ghost” 
button). Except, when the alert is confirming a high-impact deletion, the 
primary button colour can be red.  
- including the exit and cancel functions 
- describing shortly (up to approximately six words) with the title, why user’s 
attention was captured or why user was halted, by explaining what will 
happen (in case of confirmation) or what has happened (in case of an error 
alert) 
- not forcing a user to answer merely “yes” or “no” by a title question 
- avoiding repetition in the description, i.e. not using the title as the first 
sentence again or not ending the description in a question (repetitive 
information) 
- providing the results or repercussions of what just happened or what will 
happen if a user proceed in description 
- using centered phrasing 
- using uppercase-only messages for serious warnings 
- avoiding code numbers, but if required, including them at the end as 
additional information 
- applying audio signals with discretion by enabling user control in this.  
It has to be taken into consideration, that some of these recommendations and 
guidance for design can be exploited and thus having a counter-effect in the form 
of risks. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter. 
In situation awareness and assessment, determination of an alarm’s priority is 
essential. Priority is static or dynamic by type.  Statically determined priority is 
based on static values, that are analysed, typed and assigned to alarms prior to 
system implementation. Dynamically determined priority is based on change 
management and depends on the required immediacy level of an operator actor 
and the significance of the conditions to operation, process or plant safety. (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2012.) 
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In addition to multiple guidance for alarm design, OASIS Standard Common 
Alerting Protocol can be used as general format for exchanging all-hazard 
emergency alerts and public warnings over various types of networks and for 
consistent warning message dissemination simultaneously over many different 
warning systems (OASIS 2010).  
 
3.1.2 Secure by design  
The principle of “Secure by design” promotes security being as first and 
foundational in software engineering, and as guidance for designers and 
developers (Santos et al. 2017). There are numerous standards, guides and 
instructions published by national, global and public organizations and societies, 
best known of them being International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), The European Union Agency for 
Cybersecurity (ENISA), The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
and the International Society of Automation (ISA). The most significant of these 
publications are the ISO/IEC 27000-series of information security, ENISA’s 
regulations, NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the ISA-62443-series of system 
security (i.a. Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems, System 
Security Requirements and Security Levels). 
In addition, designers and developers should seek guidance from the sites of 
Common Architectural Weakness Enumerations (CAWE) and Common Software 
Weaknesses (CWE), maintained by The National Cyber Security Division at U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and MITRE Corporation. The former, 
CAWE, describes an architectural flaw in a software system resulting in a security 
vulnerability. Tactics and weaknesses are categorized by type as follows: audit, 
authenticate actors, authorize actors, cross cutting, encrypt data, identify actors, 
limit access, limit exposure, lock computer, manage user sessions, validate inputs, 
and verify message integrity. For example, by “Validate input” tactic any externally 
provided inputs are sanitized, neutralized and validated to minimize malformed 
data from entering the system and preventing code injection in the input data. 
Under this tactic is 39 weaknesses listed. (Santos et al. 2017.)  
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In the question of secure coding, developers should turn into The Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) providing tools, resources, community, 
networking, education and training for improvement the security of software. 
OWASP publishes “The OWASP Top 10” awareness document of the most critical 
security risks to web applications, lists vulnerabilities, and offers application 
security principles. Concerning the latter, among other things, it urges to minimize 
attack surface area, to apply layered security mechanisms as they increase 
security of the system as a whole, and to use positive security model (“whitelists”). 
(The Open Web Application Security Project 2017.) 
Continuing on secure coding, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI 2020) and 
the CERT Division have published Coding Standards for commonly used 
programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and Perl, and the Android™ 
platform (Carnegie Mellon University 2020). Software Engineering Institute SEI has 
developed a reference architecture for the classification and advanced 
prioritization of flaws in code, that enables automatic, accurate and adaptive 
classifying and prioritizing of alerts ensued on these flaws (Flynn 2018).   
In software development various different quality assurance methods can be used 
to evaluate the safety of systems and to prevent errors, especially in safety critical 
industries, such as aerospace or nuclear power. These methods include, for 
example, numerous risk analysis tools, fault tree analysis, fault and impact analysis 
tools, as well as deviation analysis methods and cause-elimination techniques for 
bug detecting and failure analysis. (Kotkansalo et al. 2017.) 
Besides this, there are some domain specific publications, such as guidances for 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) in energy sector. The 
OPC interoperability standard for the secure and reliable exchange of data in the 
industrial automation space and in other industries, published by the Open Platform 
Communication Foundation, also directs in implementation of alarms and events. 
The specification (available for paid members only) describes the behaviour of an 
OPC Server monitoring areas and notifying clients about alarm conditions. This 
publication covers an overview and purpose of Alarms & Events technology; an 
overview of general architecture and methodology of alarms, events, 
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acknowledgments, queries, and areas; detailed descriptions of interfaces, 
methods, parameters, and expected behaviours; detailed descriptions of data 
types and structures; and sample code containing interface definitions and error 
codes. (OPC Foundation 2017.)  
Finally, the Safety Boards and Investigation Authorities provide safety 
recommendations based on the issues identified during a safety investigation. 
These public recommendations are based on a systematic analysis performed 
during the investigation, and often published along safety incident and accident 
reports.     
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4 RISKS OF PERCEPTION IN SITUATION AWARENESS   
In a cyber environment, information can be used to influence one or more levels of 
activity. As the situational awareness required for decision-making at different 
levels of activity differs in content, thus, at different levels of activity, situational 
awareness is also affected by different information. (Kuusisto 2014.) 
As mentioned in the introduction regarding the SHELL-model, risks can arise in 
every system component (Liveware, Software, Hardware, Environment) and in the 
interfaces between them. Considering the first level of situation awareness being 
about perception of elements, information handling and communication capability 
is crucial there. Endsley (2000) states that, for example, pilots, control officers, 
operators, and medical staff must perceive and comprehend masses of fast 
changing and constantly flowing data. The lack of information is not the problem, 
rather accessing relevant and authentic data at each necessary moment is, which 
brings forth an information gap (Endsley 2000). The information gap occurs, when 
data overload becomes problematic and data must be processed before the 
required information is received (Koskinen-Kannisto 2013). Data and information 
related elements affecting to situation awareness are information sharing enablers 
(such as data and information types, amount of information, communication 
channels, information access), information sharing functions (such as information 
pull and push, information initiation), and information sharing products (such as 
information processing, information management and information analysis) 
(Koskinen-Kannisto 2013).  
As previously stated, the loss of situation awareness is based on information 
related deficits.  Systems may not be able to receive or produce necessary 
information for human decision, action and assessment. This information can be 
foreknowledge, deterrent or cautionary by nature, and possibly inaccurate, false or 
otherwise inapplicable, or not generated at all. The amount of information can be 
so excessive, that it cannot be processed and a state of paralysation occurs, or so 
low, that interpretation becomes difficult. Some information may hide or override 
other kind of information, which distorts perception and interpretation. Prejudice 
and bias affect to perception and comprehension by directing focus on 
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misinformation and making it difficult to deal with surprises, such as unexpected 
events or non-occurring expected events. (Kari 2018, paraphrased.) 
These are further discussed in the following chapters. 
 
 Risks related to Human Factors 
According to Benyon (2011), failures in attention are often defined as a reason for 
accidents. A multitasking user with divided attention can have difficulties in reacting 
and decision making when the tasks require simultaneously attention. A control 
room operator might be overwhelmed and tired of the multiplicity of notices 
requiring attention. A supervisor can end up assuming situations beforehand and 
by this bias becomes selective on sensory information awareness. (Benyon 2011.) 
However, a prerequisite for the formation of a high-level situational awareness is 
that a person is able to perceive several different things simultaneously. The 
attachment of attention to only single factor causes the tunneling of attention. This 
tunnel-like attention prevents the transfer of attention between different sources of 
information. A person is able to deal with five to nine things at a time. (Nikkinen 
2018.) 
Things that a person would not want to pay attention to can also be the subject of 
observation. If a person does not control his own attention, many outside things 
will attract him. Attentiveness has been studied by testing the perception and 
remembering of two overlapping messages (either heard or seen) in which the task 
has been to follow one message and ignore the other. As a result, the monitored 
message is remembered, but the one left in the background is not. Attention thus 
has its limitations in terms of selective, focused and shared attention. In demanding 
and rapidly changing circumstances, it is important to select the appropriate stimuli 
to deal with, as wrong choices can lead to dangerous situations. Demanding 
situational awareness tasks require the successful selection of information, the 
person's ability to direct attention to the chosen object and to maintain attention in 
this object. (Lähdeniemi 2013.) 
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A mental model is a significant factor in the formation and development of 
situational awareness, when a person interprets the information received. With the 
help of mental models, a person combines the most important information and 
forms a projection of the course of events. The wrong mental model leads to a 
situation where a person continues to projection of future and decision making on 
the basis of wrongly interpreted  information. This can occur when, for example, an 
automatic system is assumed to report any possible disturbances or deviations and  
the person no longer actively perceives possible deviations. Thereby, the level of 
situational awareness decreases. (Nikkinen 2018.) 
A state, where a person tends to look for information that supports one’s beliefs, is 
called cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is experiencing mutually 
conflicting and contradictive phenomena of the mind, and it arises when a person’s 
knowledge and attitudes conflict. It explains why a person receives and accepts 
information that supports one’s perception more easily than information that 
contradicts one’s perception. Reduction of cognitive dissonance is realized by 
behavioural change. Cognitive dissonance creates a base for other individual-level 
psychological barriers and limitations, such as confirmation bias and heuristic 
evaluation. The first occurs when a person favours information that supports one’s 
own prejudices and ignores or underestimates the information that opposes them. 
Relevant information is collected selectively, and this further distorts interpretation, 
or ambiguous material is interpreted only to reinforce one's own view. Skewed 
interpretations cause permanent beliefs and ostensible correlation. A person’s own 
view (i.e., belief) remains valid even if there are sufficiently facts to refute it to make 
the belief false. In the latter, heuristic evaluation, rules of thumb, academic 
conjectures and intuitive conclusions are used, i.e. ready-made, pre-conceived or 
acquired solutions are applied to problem solving. It aims to get close enough to 
the best possible outcome quickly, but the disadvantage is that it focuses on only 
one subset in a complex problem. (Kari 2018.) 
The previously described is recognized also in investigation reports, one of which 
states the following (AIBN 2012):  
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“In order to assess whether a situation has been correctly understood, 
one looks for information confirming one's own point of view. As a 
result, one can easily fail to register valuable information from the 
surroundings. In such cases it is essential to seek information that 
disapproves one's own perception of the situation, i.e. to ask oneself 
whether one could in fact be wrong. Excessive focus on information 
that confirms our own understanding of a situation means that we 
focus less on information that raises doubts about the correctness of 
our understanding.”  
Other causes for risks are disorders of situational awareness including time 
pressure, fatigue, restlessness, workload, and other stressors. For example, 
prevailing conditions (e.g., heat, cold, poor lighting) or a dangerous operating 
environment increase the experienced stress and make it difficult to pay attention. 
Also, an excessive amount of information can overload a person’s sensory and 
cognitive systems. A person’s ability to manage larger amounts of information 
cannot be increased beyond natural boundaries, but the amount of information and 
load should be considered already in the design of situation awareness information 
systems. Besides this, a misplaced source of information can distract the formation 
of situational awareness. Flashing lights or sound from the wrong direction may 
unnecessarily strain a person during situation. (Nikkinen 2018.) 
Franssila et al. (2014) refer in their study to Eppler and Mengis (2004) who showed 
that information (over)loading may be due to personal factors (e.g., lack of 
individual information processing ability), nature of information (e.g., ambiguity of 
information), nature of task (e.g. the urgency of the task) or information technology 
(e.g. sharing the same information content across multiple channels). The user 
should be able to customize one’s entire work environment, for example, with a 
profile that requires a "focused workflow" with minimal effort, and be able to revert 
to a real-time interruption profile when necessary and desired. The cognitive load 
in work environments can be breakdowned by the source types being (1) 
information overload, (2) continuous multi-tasking and interruptions, and (3) 
workflow complexity. Receiving large amount of information will burden one, as 
each message, document or update requires decision of how it will be processed 
and evaluation whether it is useful now, in the near future, or later or not at all. A 
large amount of incoming information arriving at an unpredictable rate will be 
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burdened if the information worker does not have effective procedures in place for 
managing the incoming information stream, and if the message stream is always 
processed ad hoc. (Franssila et al. 2014.) 
Perception is affected also by degree of activation, such as sleep, observation or 
panic. There is a connection between activation, behavioural states and 
performance. This is evident in solving complex tasks requiring attentiveness and 
monitoring when the level of activation should not be too high, nor too low. Thus, 
activation is perceived value (what a person expects to happen) minus actual value 
(what actually happens), i.e. it increases as the gap between perceived value and 
actual value widens. In other words, for example, in perceiving an alarm and 
making decision for proceeding, the actual value must increase sufficiently to 
exceed the perceived value. Correspondingly, too low degree of activation means 
low and delayed responsiveness, as, for example, happens when a person is in a 
state of tiredness or drowsiness. Reasons for this activation decrease can be due 
to performing monotonous tasks, being in darkness, standing still, feeling too 
comfortable, hearing monotonous sound of low frequency, or automation (i.e. not 
mastering self the tasks or relying too much on the technology). All of these reduce 
attentiveness. (AIBN 2012.) 
The previously described is essential especially in bridge work or in working in 
control rooms and command centers. With technology aimed at improving safety, 
the nature of this kind of work has changed from task-oriented to control-oriented. 
This, in turn, has led to the ergonomic design of workstations, the typical features 
of which are comfort of the workplace seat, good reliability of the technical 
equipment, monotonous sound world and exhausting uniformity of the air 
conditioning. These factors together with the working time poorly suitable for the 
human wakefulness rhythm contributes to an environment impairing the state of 
alertness. A tired person ignores stimuli or does not always manage to think about 
their meaning sufficiently, hence suffering from a deterioration in memory 
performance. The reaction rate can also be slowed down in an operationally 
significant manner, which creates a lack of situational awareness critical to the 
required decision-making. In a complex situation where there are too many or too 
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few stimuli, a remarkably vigilant readiness is required to process the information, 
for which the tired brain has no capacity within the time available. (Safety 
Investigation Authority 2004.) 
When a user (such as an operator, a supervisor) becomes tired of alarm stimuli 
and develops a tolerance to it, it is a question of alarm or alert fatigue, causing 
sensory load and leading to delay or absence of an alert response (West et al. 
2018). Alert fatigue results when a person is exposed to an excessive number of 
alerts leading to desensitization, ignoring, overlooking or overriding even relevant 
alerts (Kane-Gill et al. 2017). It is possible to meter alert fatigue, as Figure 11 
depicts below.  
 
Figure 11. Alert Fatigue Metrics (Kane-Gill et al. 2017) 
 
In Figure 11 above, alert fatigue is presented as a proportion of inappropriate 
overrides to total alert quantity in the presence of desensitization or high level of 
mental workload. Delayed processing time is a negative consequence of alert 
volume. A correlation between alert volume and processing time is a valuable 
information that can also be useful to evaluate for appropriate and inappropriate 
overrides separately. Accepted alerts indicate justified reaction and action. Here 
the  alert value is a sum of appropriate alerts delivered in a timely manner including 
alerts that are accepted, added to alerts with appropriate overrides warranted 
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because of the response scenario, added to alerts with overrides that were 
inappropriate. Inappropriate alerts are true positive that are overlooked and not 
warranted by work scenario. Harm/injury or threat of harm/injury is a negative 
consequence of alert fatigue and a major outcome to measure. Here it is 
noticeable, that  an alert override may be appropriate due to poor alert design, but 
there is always the possibility of resultant adverse events.  Alert quantity and 
appropriate overrides provide information about opportunities to improve alert 
performance. (Kane-Gill et al. 2017.) 
The negative effects of alert fatigue are frustration and annoyance, decline in 
memory recall about alert, inappropriate override response and delay in processing 
orders. However, if the total number of alerts is reduced, it may produce 
unacceptable impacts and compromise the sensitivity of alert system, resulting to 
decreased safety and situation awareness, and missed opportunities to avoid 
adverse outcomes. (Kane-Gill et al. 2017.) 
According to brain researcher Mona Moisala, the already more common 
concentration disorder called Attention Deficit Trait (ADT) is making people 
overloaded and anxious. Moisala states, that the risk of developing ADT is 
increased by work that is difficult to regulate and requires long-term concentration 
and new information adoption, with the requirement of continuous availability of the 
employee and constant interruptions of work. (STT 26.10.2019.) 
Already in the 1990s, American doctor Edward M. Hallowell recognized ADT and 
described people who had been living too busy for too long, doing many things at 
once, not taking breaks, jumping from one job to another, neglecting to sleep, and 
creating these behaviours, where the brain no longer functions normally (Koho, 
2018). He states that ADT springs from the environment demanding our time and 
attention and is an artefact of modern life. When human mind fills with constant 
noise and events, the brain will lose its capacity to attend fully and thoroughly to 
anything (Hallowell 2004).  
Although the default is that human-system interfaces should not impose an 
excessive workload for the user, but on the contrary should support the usability 
by, for example, window manipulation, display selection, or navigation (NUREG 
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2013), it may well be that the systems and devices themselves can be disruptive 
(Lähdeniemi 2013). Studies show that the addition of technological equipment can 
potentially lead to a decrease in productivity due to the overload of information, or 
the overload of communication, or the overload of multifarious system features, 
caused by the equipment to its users, especially to information workers. If 
technological devices are not designed with human cognitive capacity in mind, their 
use can cause undesirable effects. Excessive cognitive workload can be to blame 
for reduced performance if it results in information being overlooked and in errors. 
This is especially important to consider in situations where safety is a critical factor, 
such as air traffic control and process control. However, there are situations where 
a person is unable to perceive the necessary information, even if it is in the field of 
observation. Reasons for this can be, for example, the state of alertness of the 
body, the difficulty of selecting or finding essential information from a large amount 
of information, the difficulty of concentrating on the essentials, or the information 
processing requirements that are too one-sided or too large. Auditory and visual 
noise or movement can distract, in which case tasks may be interrupted and 
cognitive overload may arise. In this case, the quality of the work deteriorates, and 
e.g. in decision-making situations, the quality of decisions deteriorates and the time 
spent on them increases. After a distraction, it takes time to reach the same point 
as it was before the interruption. If there are numerous interruptions during the day, 
it affects work productivity through experienced time pressure and information 
overload, producing capacity disruption. Structural disruption is caused when a 
person receives two signals that require the same psychological mechanisms to 
process. These can be, for example, two visual signals, such as an alarm 
generated by a monitoring system and a simultaneous other event in the work 
environment, or several alarms at the same time. Interruptions in the task, 
attention-grabbing movements, flashes of light, and sounds strain memory, cause 
stress, and can increase the number of errors. (Lähdeniemi 2013.) 
In numerous investigations of rail, aviation, marine and road traffic accidents it has 
been stated, that operational personnel overlook easily visible information. This 
inattentional blindness due to limited capacity of perception occurs through filtering 
subconsciously the information of surroundings. An insufficient mental workload, 
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i.e. reduced alertness and ability to react due to a feeling of control in the situation, 
are often related to tasks that require monitoring. Also, low level of activation can 
result in misinterpretation of the environment. (AIBN 2012; AIBN 2013.) 
To conclude this chapter, The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) is introduced. HFACS (in Figure 12) serves as a human error framework, 
originally used by the US Air Force to investigate and analyse human factors 
aspects of aviation. The HFACS framework can be applied as a tool for 
investigations to understand the underlying causal factors having led to an 
accident. It can also be used for training purposes as well as for preventive action 
and development purposes. (SKYbrary 2019.) 
 
Figure 12. HFACS framework (HFACS Inc. 2014) 
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 Cybersecurity risks 
Levels of cyber threats include cyber vandalism, cybercrime, cyber intelligence, 
cyberterrorism, cybersabotage and cyber warfare. Selected attack methods can be 
targeted to different layers of the cyber world, such as component corruption to the 
physical layer, SQL injection to the syntactic layer, data contamination to the 
semantic layer, denial of service attack to the service layer, and identity theft to the 
cognitive layer. (Lehto 2019.) 
According to Europol’s definition, cyber-dependent crime is any crime that can only 
be committed using computers, computer networks or other forms of information 
communication technology. This criminal activity includes creation and spread of 
malware, hacking to steal sensitive personal or industry data and denial of service 
attacks to cause financial or reputational damage. European cybercrime 
investigators have identified attacks on critical infrastructure as a significant cyber 
threat. The attacks disrupt or subvert the internal functions of critical 
infrastructures, such as energy, transport, water supply, and health sectors, by 
implementing techniques such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), malware, 
cryptoware and ransomware. These cause denial of access for an organisation to 
its own data and denial of access for others to that organisation’s data or services. 
Various malware types, such as botnets, rootkits, worms, trojans, file infectors, 
backdoor or remote access trojans, and their combinations are used for DDoS, 
data theft, gaining access, spying, deleting or manipulating data, disabling files, 
monitoring, or installing additional malware. (Europol 2020.)   
The Internet Organised Crime Threat assessment (IOCTA) for 2019, published by 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and European 
Cybercrime Centre, states, that attacks to the infrastructure itself is a primary 
motive, but a financial motivation is not so much. This is said so far to be due to an 
increased risk for criminals of getting caught by drawing massive attention to the 
attack. Thus, considering the attacks to the infrastructure, these are estimated to 
be performed likely by script kiddies (on the contrary of smart attackers) and nation 
states. Crime As A Service concept available all over contributes to execution of 
these attacks. Cybercrime as a whole is evolving and concentrating even more on 
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financially profitable targets, but data will further play a significant role in it. (IOCTA 
2019.) 
One of the most serious security threats in the near future is cyberterrorism (Lehto 
2019). Cyberterrorism seeks physical destruction using information technology and 
can target, for example, air navigation systems, railroad traffic control systems, or 
production and control systems in water and electricity grid (Lehto 2019). The 
ability of technological adaptability of terrorist groups is often high and they can 
adopt early new technologies. This ability is put into practise as, for example, in in 
exploiting emerging platforms for the dissemination of propaganda. Thus, this sets 
requirements for law enforcement practitioners to anticipate, understand and 
project new and emerging technologies better than before. (IOCTA 2019.) 
As the Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper has stated, cyberthreats 
have long been at the top of threats listed by the National Intelligence Worldwide 
Threat Assessment. However, a massive Armageddon-scale attack against the 
entire infrastructure remains more unlikely to encounter, but instead low or 
moderate level cyberattacks and cyberoperations from various sources for 
manipulating data will increase. (Homeland Security News Wire 2.10.2015.) 
As for an example of significant control system requiring situation awareness, 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) technology is used as a sensor for 
several safety-critical applications, such as for guided landing approach of 
airplanes and for timing and synchronization of reference stations for 
telecommunications, electrical power supplies and the financial sector.  Rügamer 
and Kowalewski (2015) have studied deliberate interference of GNSS signals and 
stated, that jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals have become an 
underestimated risk. Jamming means intentional interference targeting the 
unavailability of the system and spoofing is faking of a false position/time towards 
a target GNSS receiver. Jammers are used for denial-of-service attacks and 
spoofers can cause a receiver to estimate a fake position and/or time without 
recognizing it – the latter posing a greater threat (Rügamer and Kowalewski 2015). 
Northern Finland encountered GPS interference on 6th of November 2018 and 
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according to Yle News (Leisti 9 November and 13 November 2018) the warning 
issued by ANS Finland was the first of its kind in Finland. 
In the field of aviation there has been a debate regarding Boeing's poor information 
security practices that have been alleged to threaten aviation safety and national 
security of U.S. Boeing test development networks are claimed to be publicly 
exposed to the internet, and email servers said to be infected with multiple strains 
of malware. Since, evidence showed that Boeing’s systems were compromised. 
The worrying matter here is, that Boeing serves also as a supplier for military. 
Apparently, it had been a while before the company took action on the basis of the 
findings publicly announced. Besides this, Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) announced, that none of the issues identified are unique to aviation. Also, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is working with airplane manufacturers 
to ensure that critical airplane systems are protected from intentional unauthorized 
electronic interference, which encompasses cybersecurity vulnerabilities. (Porup 
2019.) 
On the other hand, according to an estimation (Disso 2016) for the last decade, of 
which 99.9% of the exploited vulnerabilities were compromised still more than a 
year after the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) was published, and 
majority of malware being unique to a single organization, the speed and means 
of acting  must be questioned. The pressure for solving cybersecurity risks by the 
stakeholders and environment could possibly be more tenacious.  
As a part of Industrial Networks, Industrial PC and Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition (IPC, SCADA) systems have also faced serious cyberattacks, one of 
them being the famous Stuxnet, the 2010 uncovered computer worm. The systems 
were originally designed to automate, monitor and control in such environments 
and networks of critical infrastructure that are isolated and air gapped. Nowadays 
these facilities cover vast geographical areas, involve numerous proprietary and 
legacy devices and protocols, contain multiple data sources by type and in number, 
and are interconnected within manifold of networks, and communicating via 
Internet. Even more, considering a fact, that there is a lack of security mechanisms 
in SCADA protocols, and in availability of guidance or methodologies for data 
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acquisition at the control level, these systems offer a significant threat vector. (Blyth 
2018.) 
Vulnerabilities can occur anywhere on the assembly. For example, a floating 
production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel and its production control system, 
used by the offshore oil and gas industry for the production and processing of 
hydrocarbons and for the storage of oil, was reviewed and identified defects and 
vulnerabilities. These were, among other things, unauthorised bidirectional transfer 
of data and binaries, unauthorised access & privilege escalation, vulnerability to 
the Man in the Middle Attack, Windows services reconfiguration by non-admin 
users, insecure permissions on program files and services, unnecessary open 
ports, multiple transport layer encryption Weaknesses (Gorkowienko 2018). Thus, 
an attacker can use several techniques in various of targets in order to reach one’s 
aim, whatever it may be (illustrated in Figure 13). 
 
 
Nevertheless, cybersecurity is a social challenge as well, besides the technical 
one. This has come to light in the form of attacks that use social engineering and 
other tactics aimed at human weaknesses. With respect to the fact, that there still 
exists systems with serious design flaws leaving users vulnerable to sophisticated 
Figure 13. Attack routes 
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attacks, should more and more attention be paid to secure by design principle for 
systems to meet the basic requirements. If most users cannot even correctly 
interpret SSL security error and warning messages generated by the web browser 
during the authentication process for a secure connection, it is not a solution to 
offer them a possibility to bypass or ignore security mechanisms. The whole chain 
of security must be watertight. (Mujinga et al. 2017.) 
For example, a critical data repository (including certain core registries) is 
considered contaminated and integrity collapsed if 6% of its data has been 
rendered unreliable by an integrity attack, either over a long period of time or as a 
one-off attack (Kuusisto 2014). In industrial plants, the contamination of even one 
sensor or processor can cripple the entire plant's operation due to a deficient 
application and network architecture. 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs published a comprehensive report of 
Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities with threat summary and 
recommendations, where it is suggested that nuclear plants may lack 
preparedness for a large-scale cybersecurity emergency, particularly if one were 
to occur outside normal working hours. At that time, the latest publicly known 
incident at a nuclear facility was the hacking of Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power 
Co. commercial network in December 2014, where the hackers infiltrated and stole 
data from the commercial network. They gained access by sending phishing emails 
to the employees, resulting to clicked links and downloaded malware. The purpose 
of the hack was to obtain the blueprints and manuals of two reactors, and to use 
them for extortion. This kind of incidents are estimated to be relatively frequent in 
the domain. The report states, that greatest cybersecurity issue facing the nuclear 
industry is about actors not entirely understanding the risks. Furthermore, a cultural 
challenge manifests itself by difficulties in communication between nuclear plant 
personnel (i.e. operational technology engineers) and cybersecurity personnel 
(information technology engineers). It has also been found that this challenge is 
aggravated when the cybersecurity personnel operates from the off-site location. 
In summary, it has been found that thee risk of a serious cyberattack on civil 
nuclear infrastructure is growing. (Baylon et al. 2015.) 
53 
 
Since then, the E & E News (Sobczak and Behr 2017) and other media reported in 
June 2017 of unidentified hackers having breached at least one US nuclear power 
plant. The attack was named as The Nuclear 17, and it was speculated that it could 
have been a part of a simultaneous global cyberattack. On October 2019, The 
Hacker News (Kumar 2019) brought out the sequence of events of the cyberattack 
at Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu, India. This attack was limited 
to an Internet-connected computer used for administrative purposes, which was 
isolated from mission-critical systems at the nuclear facility. Based on all this, it can 
be assumed that cyberattacks continue to increase and that the majority of them 
will never come public knowledge.  
 
 False alarms 
As indicated above, an attacker can use several techniques for various targets 
attacking on a facility, installation or a plant. These techniques include operating 
system attacks, misconfiguration attacks, application level attacks and default code 
attacks, physical attacks or signal attacks. An attacker can perform denial of 
service, spoofing or jamming. Operating systems, applications, configurations, 
devices, databases and telecommunication can all be vulnerable. The aim of an 
attacker is to impact on data and information, and therefore to perception and 
situation awareness, for example, by altering data (adding, deleting or changing 
the content), by prohibiting information exchange (prevention/inhibition, delay), or 
by generating false (nuisance) warnings, alerts and alarms. This will cause the trust 
in the situation awareness system to weaken and the usability and effectiveness 
will no longer be at required level. 
Giraldo et al. published 2018 a survey of physics-based attack detection in cyber-
physical systems. The research question was how to detect false sensor or false 
control attacks. They expressed their interest being in false sensor measurements, 
false control signals manipulating vehicle platoons or manipulating demand-
response systems, and the sabotage Stuxnet manipulating the rotation frequency 
of centrifuges. The survey aimed to build indicators of attacks using real-time 
measurements of physical world. Before Giraldo’s et al. survey Mo et Sinopoli 
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studied 2010 two possible classes of attacks, which are Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks and deception attacks (i.e. false data injection attacks). They describe that 
a DoS attack prevents the exchange of information, usually either sensor readings 
or control inputs between sub-systems, while false data injection attack affects the 
data integrity of packets by modifying their payloads. 
According to Zhao et al. (2018) a false data injection attack (FDIA) is by type a 
perfect interaction and a conform of inferior data. The researchers  presented 
various types of attacks all being part of a class of false-data injection attacks 
(FDIAs), where an attacker accesses real-time measurements (for example 
electricity consumption in a power plant) and changes them before the 
measurements are utilized for state estimation in a control center. They refer to Liu 
et al. (2011), who demonstrated the existence of three types of FDIAs that are state 
attacks, topology attacks and load redistribution attacks. These attacks are 
accomplished by random, targeted or generalized false data injection. In a random 
false data injection attack an attacker aims to find any attack vector as long as it 
can lead to a wrong estimation of state variables. In a targeted false data injection 
attack an attacker aims to find an attack vector that can inject arbitrary errors into 
certain state variables i.e. that can inject a specific error into certain state variables. 
In a generalized false data injection attacks an attacker can utilize the small 
measurement errors typically tolerated by state estimation algorithms so that the 
impact of false data injection attacks can be further increased without being 
detected. It is possible, that an attacker remains undetected if she/he is able to 
determine a current configuration of a target system while injecting malicious 
measurements that will compromise the whole state estimation process of a plant 
or vehicle.  
Giraldo et al. state (2018), that the control systems are usually designed to be 
observable so that the only way to fool them into thinking it is at a false state, is by 
compromising the sensors and sending false sensor readings. However, Zero-
dynamics attacks are carried out injecting fake signals in sensors and modifying 
hidden or unobservable states. The attacker can also perform a physical attack (for 
example a theft of a device  or physical tampering of meters) and at the same time 
launch a cyber-attack by compromising sensors to send false data masking the 
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physical attack. This is called a combined use of cyber- and physical attack or a 
covert attack. Fake signals can also be transmitted as in Global Positioning System 
spoofing attacks, where a spoofer generates a counterfeit GPS signal and sends 
it to a GPS antenna replacing a real reading with a fake position, or in attacks on 
other control signal systems where an incorrect signal can cause disconnections 
or blackouts.  
Neither healthcare domain is immune to hacking. In the 2019 list of Top 10 Health 
Technology Hazards published by the ECRI Institute, ranked as first is remotely 
hacking systems, allowing malicious software to be installed, data stealing or 
conversion, or other means to attack the target system. An attacker can render a 
device or a system inoperative or compromise device or system, which leads to 
degraded performance, puts patient at risk and hinders patient care.  
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, wireless infusion pumps with weak cybersecurity can 
expose a health care enterprise to system breaches that pose serious operational 
and safety risks, e.g. access by malicious actors, breach of protected health 
information, loss or disruption of health care services or damage to productivity. 
Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, Inc. HIMSS is a global 
advisor and thought leader supporting the transformation of the health ecosystem 
through information and technology, and publishes Healthcare IT News. In the 
article on 5 March 2018 by Bill Siwicki it is said, that 71% of IoT medical device 
ransomware infections caused by user practice issues, such as using embedded 
browsers on medical workstations to surf the web, conduct online chat or download 
content. This makes the attack vector enlarge.  
Though alarm-related events happen in all health care environments, they are 
estimated to be underreported (Joint Commission 2013). In the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration’s (FDA) Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience 
(MAUDE) database there are 566 alarm-related patient deaths reported between 
January 2005 and June 2010. In the Joint Commission’s Sentinel Event database 
there are reports of 98 alarm-related events between January 2009 and June 2012, 
of which 80 resulted in death, 13 in permanent loss of function, and five in 
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unexpected additional care or extended stay. The Joint Commission states, that 
common injuries or deaths related to alarms included those from falls, delays in 
treatment, ventilator use and medication errors, and all of these events were traced 
back to alarm system issues. The major contributing factors in the reported events 
were absent or inadequate alarm system, improper alarm settings, non-audible 
alarm signals in all areas or inappropriately turned off alarm signals. The other 
contributing factors were alarm fatigue, uncustomized  and non-individual alarm 
settings (i.e. default settings are not adjusted for the individual patient or for the 
patient population), inadequate staffing to support or respond to alarm signals, 
alarm conditions and settings that are not integrated with other medical devices, 
and equipment malfunctions and failures. (Joint Commission 2013.) 
Every day several hundred up to tens of thousands alarm signals are generated 
each day from monitoring a single patient to monitoring function in the whole 
hospital (Joint Commission 2013). If it turns out so, that most alarm signals would 
not always require clinical intervention, will clinicians become more and more 
desensitized or immune to the sounds and become overwhelmed by information, 
suffering from alarm fatigue. As a result, the volume of the alarm may be turned 
down, turned off, or the alarm settings adjusted outside the safe and appropriate 
limits. This can have serious and fatal consequences. Medical personnel 
throughout the world have tried to solve this challenge of reacting to true positive 
alarms, false positive and false negative alarms, as in the Summit of Medical 
Device Alarm 2011. Attempts to form a policy on nuisance alarm problem have 
been made. So far, the preferred response to alarms has been to question what is 
wrong, check out the circumstances and fix the cause. If clinicians are 
overwhelmed by false alarms, there will not be sufficiently time fix all alarms issues. 
The solution takes form in providing clinical context to alarms and by saving all 
alarm information for analysis and judgement. (Joint Commission 2013.) 
However, suppressing alarms cannot be the only solution to process and manage 
false or nuisance alarms. It is true, that so far alarm functionalities in most situation 
awareness systems have based on users’ respond to every single alarm. This 
creates more requirements for human operators’ ability to monitor and will increase 
their cognitive workload. A difficult dilemma is faced, because on the other hand 
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automation can mask relevant information and diminishes that way situational 
awareness. 
In the domain of aviation, the integrity of the alerting system should be examined 
due to its effect to the flight crew’s trust and response when assessing an alert, it 
says in publication “Human Factors Considerations in the Design and Evaluation 
of Flight Deck Displays and Controls” (Yeh et al. 2016) by Human Factors Division 
of Federal Aviation Administration of U.S.. Concerning false and nuisance alerts, 
the impact of them as frequently occurring event increases flight crew’s workload, 
reduces flight crew’s confidence in the alerting system (generates distrust), and 
affects their reaction in case of a real alert (slower response to real and high-
urgency alerts or suppressing an alert before determining whether a hazardous 
condition exists). This may lead to ignoring and disabling real alerts when they are 
presented. That is why the alert function must be designed to minimize the effects 
of false and nuisance alerts by preventing the presentation of an inappropriate or 
unnecessary alert and by providing a means to suppress an attention-getting 
component of an alert caused by a failure of the alerting function that interferes 
with the flight crew's ability to safely operate the airplane. Shortly said, the alerting 
functions or system should be designed to avoid false alerts and nuisance alerts, 
while providing reliable alerts to the flight crew when needed.   
Thus, systems that have a high incidence of false alarms contributes to monitoring 
problems due to lack of trust in automation (Endsley 1996). Since the 1980’ies it 
has been reported of several aviation accidents related to heeding of automatic 
alarms based on the lack into the system due to its high false alarm rate. Flight 
crew have ignored or disabled alarms or neglected to monitor the automation and 
its parameters or not comprehended the significance of alarms. On the other hand, 
automation can mask failures and degraded conditions when compensating for 
them (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC 2012). This may prohibit a user 
to determine causes of degraded conditions and failures and leads to the 
operator’s loss of situation awareness, which makes difficult for personnel to take 
over the situation in circumstances where automation does not compensate any 
more. A user may have a diminished understanding and appreciation for the overall 
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situation as a result from automation due to processing less information or 
processing information at less depth.  
In addition to false alarms and FDIAs, the non-desirable effects and risks will 
cumulate with false predictions as base or source information (Huovila et al.  2010) 
or with problems related to working environment and information ergonomic design 
in operator’s control rooms (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2012). This is to 
be seen, for example, in using prediction information, when the real-time risk 
assessment and subsequent warning decision is based on the forecast alone, the 
risk area is large and false alarms are possible. But when the real-time risk 
assessment and warning is based both on the observation and forecast of the 
development of the situation, the risk area can be precisely delimited, and the 
likelihood of false alarms is low. Furthermore, this combined with portioned 
information visibility as in limited viewing areas of information display screens or 
other factors and design solutions that may narrow attention only to local and one-
timely problems instead of overall awareness.  
Based on previously described (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2012), an 
attacker can generate too many or too few alarms (positive, false negative, false 
positive) by utilizing following alarm characteristics and system features during 
development, implementation or use: 
- in alarm definition: altering or creating false definitions, for example, on 
alarm categories or their parameters. Operators will eventually become less 
likely to respond to alarms, especially performing cognitively demanding 
tasks, when established setpoints produce many false alarms. Frequent 
false indications contributes to failure to recognize a serious condition. 
- in alarm signal, signal condition or alarm generation processing: influencing 
on signals or sensors or parameters by falsifying or otherwise manipulating 
(deletion, addition) selection, automatic evaluation, analysing or validation 
on setpoint exceeding 
- in alarm prioritization: affecting on determination of the relative importance 
of alarms for the operating crew  
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- in alarm message availability: affecting to selection of alarms to be 
presented for user based on alarm priority and alarm condition priority. This 
can lead to emphasizing the minor or less important messages instead of 
emphasizing the important ones and will result to focusing operator’s 
attention on the messages with the least operational significance.  
- in alarm routing: mixing or changing transmission to appropriate recipient. 
All alarms should not be addressed to control room operators, as, for 
example, diagnostic alarms used by maintenance personnel.   
In addition, an attacker can interfere with user’s perception by manipulating the 
visualization of alarms, for example, by changing (reconfiguring) alarm symbols, or 
distorting colours or notification messages, which affects the interpretation of their 
importance. An attacker could also try to mislead by interfering with the number or 
timing of alerts. Furthermore, an attacker can also affect on user-system interaction 
by altering factors in working environment, for example, tampering and changing 
inputs or modes on display devices, which leads to uncoordinated visualization and 
problems in perception. The following Figure brings forth one point of view of this 
risk situation.  
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Figure 14. Example of a risk entity 
 
To return to the concept of false alarm, Wikipedia (Wikipedia 2020a; Wikipedia 
2020b) gives a concrete example of it: it is the deceptive or erroneous report of an 
emergency, causing unnecessary panic and bringing resources, such as 
emergency services, to a place where they are not needed. However, there is a 
semantic problem considering the sensor operation being false due to its true 
indication of the present state by nature. This does not take a position on a chance 
of a feint yet. The advisory circular 25.13222-1 by Federal Aviation Administration 
defines a false alert as an incorrect or spurious alert caused by a failure of the 
alerting system including the sensor. As it has previously turned out, "nuisance 
alert" as a parallel term of "false alert" has been also used in some context in other 
domains. The possible definitions of a false alarm are outlined in the following 
picture.  
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Picture 2. False alarm definitions   
 
False alarms pose a significant challenge also in Security Information and Event 
Management (SIEM) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) systems providing 
real-time analysis of security alerts generated by applications and network 
hardware. There have been incidents on massive data breaches with no action 
taken because alerts about the breach were treated as likely false alerts, or with 
even some of the network infiltration alerting system turned off due to too many 
false positive alerts. It has been found out, that large global enterprises can receive 
more than 10 000 alerts each month, of those about half being false positives and 
over two thirds being redundant. However, security operations managers have 
been reported to see even 5000 security alerts in one day. Near 40 % of the 
enterprises reviews manually each alert, thus, requiring a human analyst resource 
to verify the threat between a bona-fide, or clear but not applicable, or too minor. 
These human analysts encounter information overload due to incapability of a 
system to filter out anomalies prior to alert generation. It has also been found out, 
that enterprises can investigate only a little over half of the alerts received in a day, 
half of which is justified, and half of those justified leads to action. (Francis 2017.) 
However, SIEM and IDS systems have their own requirements in terms of alarm 
functionality compared to industrial control systems, so they are not discussed 
further here. Their potentiality of development, as well as the alarm philosophy and 
management differ from the subject of this study. There are also numerous studies 
about management of nuisance alarms in industrial domain. These nuisance 
alarms can result from the inconsistency between the alarm design and operating 
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states. The solution can be an implementation of a dynamic alarm system. Still, it 
is possible, that a clear majority of alarms in systems can actually be false.  
The following Figure 15  illustrates a chain of event of false alarms with influencing 
factors and elements to situation.  
 
Figure 15. Chain of events 
The Figure 15 above (also as appendix 1) represents a situation, where an attacker 
executes a false alarm attack and where the controls of operational security and 
cybersecurity are insufficient. The challenge of the situation increases with false 
alarms multiplied and being possibly used as a feint. The actual alarm of a critical 
component, to which the operator should immediately respond to, can remain 
hidden that the risk of an accident gets triggered, or  by the time it takes to detect 
or process it. Or, due to the increased workload, there is no time to deal with it, 
until the accident already occurs. Also, the time elapsed between reconnaissance 
and attack execution can be long, such as weeks or months, although in this 
illustration it is presumed to be up to one day.  
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4.3.1 Design issues for mitigation of vulnerabilities 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a physical sciences 
laboratory and an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, maintains the 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD). NVD is the U.S. government repository of 
standards-based vulnerability management data containing a dictionary of publicly 
known information security vulnerabilities and exposures knowns as the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). CVE is a list of entries of publicly known 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), in turn, is 
a community-developed list of common software and hardware security 
weaknesses by type, offering a common language and serving as a baseline for 
weakness identification, mitigation, and prevention efforts. The CWE list is 
maintained by the MITRE Corporation, which is a not-for-profit organization 
working in the public interest across federal, state and local governments, as well 
as industry and academia. NVD integrates CWE into the scoring of CVE 
vulnerabilities by providing a cross section of the overall CWE structure. NVD is 
using CWE as a classification mechanism that differentiates CVEs by the type of 
vulnerability they represent. A vulnerability is defined as a weakness in the 
computational logic (e.g., code) found in software and hardware components that, 
when exploited, results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability. Mitigation of the vulnerabilities can involve coding changes, 
specification changes or specification deprecations (e.g., removal of affected 
protocols or functionality in their entirety). (The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology NIST 2020c; MITRE 2020.) 
A search done in NVD by the words “false alarm” (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology 2020a) or “false alert” (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology NIST 2020b) produced vulnerabilities listed by the period of 2015-
2020, such as:  
− a vulnerability allowing user inputs to be reflected as error or warning 
messages, misleading the victim to follow malicious instructions inserted by 
external attackers, and leading to Cross Site Request Forgery, severity 
classified as medium (CVE-2020-6206 SAP Cloud Platform Integration for 
Data Services; CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery)  
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− a vulnerability allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL 
commands i.a. via certain parameters to d4d/alarms.php, severity classified 
as critical. (CVE-2012-1259 Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Plixer 
International Scrutinizer NetFlow & sFlow Analyzer; CWE-89 Improper 
Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command) 
− a vulnerability allowing remote attackers to trigger false alerts via crafted 
packets to the upload port, severity classified as medium (CVE-2012-4026 
The Johnson Controls Pegasys P2000 server with software; CWE-20 
Improper Input Validation) 
− a vulnerability of missing encryption of sensitive data, caused by specially 
crafted malicious radio transmissions, allowing an attacker to remotely 
trigger false alarms, severity classified as low (CVE-2018-8864 ATI Systems 
Emergency Mass Notification Systems devices; CWE-311 Missing 
Encryption of Sensitive Data, CWE-287 Improper Authentication) 
− a vulnerability of not using integrity protection, facilitating man-in-the-middle 
attackers to initiate a false alarm or deactivate an alarm by modifying the 
client-server data stream, severity classified as medium (CVE-2015-8254 
The Frontel protocol before 3 on RSI Video Technologies Videofied devices; 
CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity).  
In addition to above mentioned, weakness types such as Missing Encryption of 
Sensitive Data (CWE-311) and Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive 
Information (CWE-209) can contribute to false alarms. Regarding the first, omitting 
the use of encryption in any program which transfers data over a network of any 
kind should be considered as an unnecessary risk, and causes that the victims 
have not really any means to separate valid data from invalid. Considering the 
latter, programs might reveal passwords in error messages if an attacker can 
trigger certain database errors, which enables an attacker to use the contents of 
error messages for launching another more focused attack. Herein, it is 
noteworthy, that SCADA products use HTTP Basic Authentication, which is not 
encrypted. CWE offers good mitigation information in connection within each 
weakness type listed, but the most important piece of advice could possibly be that 
all input is assumed malicious. (MITRE 2020.)  
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5 THE LOSS OF SITUATION AWARENESS IN DIFFERENT DOMAINS 
Research indicates that many of the performance and safety problems occurring 
in the large-scale industrial systems domain may result from deficits with operators’ 
situational awareness. One analysis of offshore drilling accidents demonstrated 
that more than 40% of those accidents were related to situation awareness. In that 
analysis it turned out also, that the majority of situational awareness errors (67%) 
occurred at the perceptual level, 20% related to comprehension, and 13% were 
manifested during projection. (Naderpour et al. 2015.) 
Naderpour et al. studied 2015 the role of situation awareness in three accidents in 
the process sector and analyzed situation awareness related errors. The identified 
errors were able to be categorized in errors due to a lack of appropriate design of 
operator support systems or in errors due to poor mental models. Naderpour 
highlights, that there is an urgent need to discover cognitive support systems in 
order to lower operator workload and stress and consequently human errors. 
Naderpour describes the explosion at Bellwood, Illinois occurred on 14 June 2006 
as follows: the ignition of a vapor cloud generated by mixing and heating a 
flammable liquid in an open top tank located in a chemical mixing area killed one 
contractor and injured two employees, and caused a significant business 
interruption. This ignition was generated by malfunction of a temperature controller, 
which allowed the steam valve to remain open and heat the mixture to its boiling 
point, the operator without knowing the inside temperature of the tank. Besides 
this, due to a failure of the system design of high temperature alarm missing, the 
operator lacked substantive information for situation awareness. There have been 
speculations on infrared thermometer information being available, but not been 
observed for some reasons by the operator. Reasons for that might have been e.g. 
plain omission, attentional narrowing or external distractions due to for instance 
high workload or prior expectations to see assumed rather than real situation. 
(Naderpour et al. 2015.) 
A taxonomy for classifying and describing errors in situation awareness was 
developed by Endsley, based on the elements of human information processing 
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and cognition, as well as the factors affecting situation awareness at each of its 
three levels (Endsley 1999). The taxonomy is illustrated in the Table 2 below.  
 
SA level I Fail to perceive or misperception of information 
1.1 Data not available 
1.2 Data hard to discriminate or difficult to detect (e.g., visual barrier) 
1.3 Failure to monitor or observe data due to omission, attention narrowing, 
distraction or high workload 
1.4 Misperception of data 
1.5 Memory failure 
SA level II Improper integration or comprehension of information 
2.1 Lack or incomplete mental model 
2.2 Use of incorrect mental model 
2.3 Over-reliance on default values in model 
SA level III Incorrect projections of future trends 
3.1 Lack or incomplete mental model 
3.2 Over-projection of current trends 
Table 2. The taxonomy for situation awareness errors (Endsley 1999) 
This taxonomy has been used in different domains, among other things in 
analyzing accidents in process industry, in aviation accident investigations and in 
health care reviews. Studies tend to show so far, that the large majority of the errors 
is attributed to level 1 i.e. in perception, the second most category being level 2 
errors i.e. in comprehension.  
 
 Nautical  
In Finland, the maritime traffic management operates on the basis of a so-called 
maritime traffic situation picture, which includes a combined radar image and the 
ship's AIS data, involving the name of the vessel, the purpose of the vessel and 
the position of the vessel. In addition, the maritime traffic situation picture includes 
VHF radio announcements that indicate which vessel is involved, the vessel’s 
route, where the vessel is heading, and whether the vessel is aware of other 
movers. Furthermore, the general maritime traffic management situation picture 
includes vessel schedules (port lists), weather and ice condition, as well as 
expected potential problems or deviations, port disturbances, fairway disturbances, 
broken equipment and safety equipment deviations. In maritime traffic 
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management, both decision-making and situation information are centralized and 
the predictability of situations is emphasized. Studies have demonstrated that 
operators face challenges in understanding a situation picture with only minor 
changes. In addition, personal characteristics have been found to influence the 
perception of things. One of the objectives is to develop a learning situation picture 
system, so that maritime risks could be identified and warned automatically, and  
for identification of normal situations, that may vary depending e.g. on the type of 
vessel, weather conditions or tides. (Koistinen 2011.) 
According to the 2001-2005 vessel accident analysis, the most common causes of 
accidents were human errors and conditions outside the vessel (e.g. weather). Of 
all accidents, 49% were partly due to human factors, that were in 38% as the main 
cause. Loss of situational awareness is not recorded as a separate category, but 
the related categories of causes are as follows: (A) Circumstances outside the 
vessel, such as (A04) failure of navigation equipment, lights or other electrical 
equipment, or (C) Technical condition of vessels’ equipment, such as (C01) 
navigation equipment failure; or (D) Equipment operation and type problems and 
human-machine problem, such as (D05) other device operating problem; or F) 
Routines, communication, and organization, such as (F01) deficient control 
routines, (F10) deficient monitoring and maintenance routines, and (F15) deficient 
security routines; or (G) Human errors, such as (G04) improper use of warning 
devices, (G08-G09) misunderstandings and (G13) special circumstances 
(excessive work). One of the accidents was due to navigating by a bus sign and 
trusting its location, even though the bus sign had moved out of place. As a result, 
the vessel came into contact with the ground. The shortcomings of the database 
and of the marine casualty reports, used as a source, have made it difficult to 
conduct a reliable analysis, as well as the fact that the reports did not have a similar 
causal field as the database. (Finnish Maritime Administration 2007.) 
According to International Maritime Organization IMO (2020), maritime cyber risk 
refers to a measure of the extent to which a technology asset could be threatened 
by a potential circumstance or event, which may result in shipping-related 
operational, safety or security failures as a consequence of information or systems 
being corrupted, lost or compromised. In the shipping industry, cyber can be 
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categorized into threats to ships and safe navigation, satellite communication, 
cargo tracking systems, marine Radar systems and automatic Identification 
systems (Paganini 2016). The maritime cybersecurity survey conducted in 2017 to 
companies revealed, that 34 percent of respondents had experienced a 
cyberattack in the previous 12 months, mostly suffering from ransomware and 
phishing (Rider 2018). Various attack techniques can be used, such as hacking the 
electronic chart systems ECDIS of navigation or the satellite communications 
(Munro 2018). The first utilizes the fact, that ECDIS are often ran by old operating 
systems and crew tends to rely persistently on them instead of seeking other visual 
information. The latter is due to that many satcom terminals on ships are available 
on the public internet and have default credentials, e.g. admin/1234 (Munro 2018). 
Ships are said to be complex industrial systems, only floating, transporting high-
value cargo with legacy systems, combined with poor processes and awareness, 
while the seaports they dock in often suffering from the same cybersecurity 
problems. The ensemble of systems includes i.a. VSAT, GSM/LTE and Wi-Fi 
connections, crew internet access, electronic navigation systems, ECDIS, 
propulsion, load management and multiple other complex customized systems. 
Gaining access to these systems predisposes vessels to loss of navigation, control 
and situation awareness offering e.g. pirates to steer the vehicle in the territory 
where it can be robbed (such as in incident of a vessel from Cyprus to Djibouti in 
2017). Also, access provides opportunities for criminals to influence to the control 
of the movement of containers for smuggling illegal material (such as in the Belgian 
port town of Antwerp). (Magee 2018.)  
In 2017 a massive GPS spoofing attack crippled navigation on over 20 vessels in 
the Black Sea (Goward 2017). There is no indication of the diminishing of 
cyberattacks in maritime industry either, therefore, development measures are 
needed to improve security and safety.  
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 Aviation 
According to SKYbrary - an electronic repository of safety knowledge related to 
flight operations - situational awareness from a pilot’s perspective means having a 
mental picture of the existing inter-relationship of location, flight conditions, 
configuration and energy state of an aircraft as well as any other factors that could 
affect safety such as proximate terrain, obstructions, airspace reservations and 
weather systems. In turn, for a controller, situational awareness means acquiring 
and maintaining a mental picture of the traffic situation managed and maintaining 
an appreciation of the potential for unexpected progressions or changes. A 
potential consequence of inadequate situational awareness is a loss of control. 
(SKYbrary 2019.) 
In aviation, as a pioneer in so many respects, there are multiple traffic and safety 
advisory systems, such as the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System 
(EICAS) and the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) designed to 
support situation awareness, and to ease pilot stress in abnormal and emergency 
situations and for instant assessment of the situation. These systems can monitor 
aircraft functions displaying and relaying them to the pilots by messages detailing 
failures and by listed procedures for undertaking corrections to the problem. The 
system limitations after failures can also be illustrated within. Caution messages 
and affected systems are presented on the displays with a colour-coded scheme 
using three-level classification on alerts. The importance and urgency of the 
corrective actions required defines the level of an alert. The highest priority is in 
level 3 relaying of an emergency and urging the crew to take immediate corrective 
or palliative action. Level 3 alerts are visualised as warning light flashing in red. 
Level 2 cautions relay to an abnormal configuration requiring immediate crew 
awareness, but no immediate and mandatory corrective actions. These are 
visualised by an amber caution light. Level 1 cautions relay to a configuration 
requiring crew monitoring, that are often failures leading to a loss of redundancy or 
degradation of a system. (SKYbrary 2017.) 
Endsley conducted a study on major air carrier accidents from the years 1989-1992  
in the U.S. by analysing accident investigation reports with the taxonomy of 
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situation awareness errors (presented in Table 2). In total 15 accidents were 
related to situation awareness loss, including multiple errors in single report. 
Altogether 32 situation awareness errors were found, of those the majority (23 pcs, 
72%) being level 1 situation awareness errors i.e. failures to perceive information 
in the situation. 22% (7 pcs) were level 2 errors in which the data was perceived 
but not integrated or comprehended correctly. Finally, errors were least on level 3 
i.e. in projecting the near future based on the aircrew’s understanding of the 
situation. (Endsley 1999.) 
Studies have indicated that the frequency of situation awareness problems in 
operational errors ranges between 59 % and 88 % in aviation (Schulz et al. 2016). 
This has proved to be fact also in the investigation report of an accident and loss 
of control near Tallinn airport on 28.2.2018 during a training flight. There were 
some contributing technical factors, such as a false caution of a fault and warning 
messages displayed with a delay, and malfunctions of the override mechanisms 
inducing on message triggering. The latter were such as erratic signals coming 
from micro-switches caused by a non-standard displacement of an override 
mechanism piston, and by wrong oil type in the override mechanism clutch unit. 
Also, a system design flaw allowed a single event to cause the loss of pitch control. 
Several warning messages were generated, but there were no reaction to these 
warnings, and the flight continued despite of repetitive warnings. Contributing facts 
were, that the training instructor was performing in two roles, as a monitoring pilot 
and as an instructor, hence, the task sharing being different from a normal 
situation. The role change might have caused a delay in understanding the 
situation, taken into account that the performance of the student pilot compared to 
an experienced pilot is often lower in a stressful emergency situation. In addition, 
the role of the Safety Pilot being not clearly defined might have caused confusion 
considering the task sharing had to be improvised under a stressful situation. This 
all resulting to, that the training instructor and the student did not comprehend the 
situation and shared their lack of understanding, due to information overload and 
confusion from the unexpected situation. However, according to the existing 
recommendations concerning duties and responsibilities, the commander is 
responsible to monitor the level of fatigue of all the crew members, and during the 
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flight the commander can decide to stop the flight activity anytime due to the level 
of fatigue of the crew members and the occurrence of technical faults. (Estonian 
Safety Investigation Bureau 2019.) 
In turn, key factors for runway safety include radio phraseology, communication 
format, equipment, airport lighting and markings, aerodrome maps, operational 
factors, as well as situational awareness and human factors. Situations in which 
pilots do not follow air traffic control instructions are often the result of a loss of 
communication or loss of situational awareness. These situation are such, that 
pilots may think they are at a different point in the airport than they actually are, or 
they may think they have been allowed to taxi on the runway. Other factors that 
predispose to pilots' errors are deficient signs and markings at the airport. Air traffic 
control can give instructions exactly as the aircraft is taxiing after landing, making 
it difficult to hear air traffic control in the cockpit. Pilots can lose situational 
awareness by focusing on tasks where the gaze is kept low and performing 
complex tasks can result in pilots rushing too much. The complex design of the 
airport area, especially for runway crossings, can also expose pilots to mistakes. 
Incomplete taxiing instructions are a risk, as are last-minute changes to taxiing 
routines. One of the commonly identified reasons for the loss of situational 
awareness is paying attention or channeling of interest to only one activity or event. 
(Safety Investigation Authority 2018a.) 
Although the general automation of systems, many of them require manual control 
by operators e.g. in situation where parameters exceed specified set points and 
operators need to act. Manual control and automation should be appropriately 
combined in system design, so that accidents like the 2009 Air France 447 crash 
into the Atlantic Ocean due to erroneous information of airspeed sensors for 
primary flight instruments and autopilot would not happen again, and so that real-
time operators would correctly adapt to situation when the automation is suddenly 
not functioning properly. (Gaba et al. 2013.) 
As for the cybersecurity in aviation, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), the European Centre for Cybersecurity in Aviation (ECCSA) and the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) each are developing cybersecurity 
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by strategies, toolkits and guidance material, such as the Security Management 
System Manual or Aviation Cyber Security Toolkit. These are increasingly needed 
for the growing amount of cyber threats encountered.  
 
Connectivity of aircraft systems provides a vast attack surface. Aircrafts’ complex 
data networks cannot be monitored as effectively as the comparable ground-based 
networks, thus, lacking the ability to avoid and respond to potential cybersecurity 
incidents. Modern digitalisation with advanced technologies, such as Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
(ADS-B) can be susceptible to manipulation by hostile actors. There is some 
indications of the link between the Aircraft Communication Addressing and 
Reporting System (ACARS) and Flight Management System (FMS) being a 
potential access point (i.e. an attack pathway) into aircraft systems. This link may 
compromise navigation functions, some authorities disclaiming it and asserting that 
it would not work in real world. Another system, the Airborne Collision Avoidance 
System X (ACAS-X) utilizes probabilistic modelling and dynamic programming to 
determine the best course of action with the help of multiple data sources (including 
ADS-B), and in generating  avoidance warnings and commands. The increasing 
amount of integrations and data sources causes the appearance of risks. The 
threat scenario is, that adversaries attempt to cause ACAS to take avoiding action 
on false ADS-B signals, which may result to loss of situation awareness and 
control. One of the vulnerable systems can also be the In-Flight Entertainment 
(IFE), due to multiple versions of this software being freely available online. 
Utilizing this provides possibilities e.g. for tampering of lighting or manipulation of 
displayed information. Also, airports arise adversary interest due to their nature of 
being as federated management systems with multiple interdependent service 
providers. Deficiencies in airport cybersecurity contribute to allowing bypass, 
subversion, and eventual breaches of physical security. Finally, the human element 
cannot be omitted. In practise, employees having legitimate access to large 
amounts of sensitive data that attracts cyber criminals, fraudsters, and terrorists, 
are vulnerable to attack. (Cooper 2017.) 
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There have been some news reports (Murdock 2018) on vulnerabilities and 
security weaknesses in satellite communication (SATCOM) technology that allows 
in-flight aircraft hacking from the ground. Also, the cyber experts of U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are known for having remotely breached 
the defenses of a Boeing 757 commercial plane (Biesecker 2017). The vanishing 
of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 in 2014 has also been a subject of 
speculations of a cyberattack (Infosec 2014).  
 
Jamming attacks consist of an intentional emission of radio frequency signals to 
interfere with the operation of a radar. The principal types are mechanical jamming 
(i.e. reflecting or re-reflecting the radar energy back to the source to produce false 
target returns on the operator’s scope) and electronic jamming (i.e. specific device 
jammers generating signals to interfere with target’s radar, as blocking the receiver 
with highly concentrated energy signals by noise or repeater techniques and 
repeater techniques). Jamming causes losses and deletion of messages, resulting 
in adoption of less efficient or less accurate surveillance and control methods. This 
is significant especially in high density areas, such as in the environments of major 
international airports, where disorders of surveillance or collision avoidance could 
result in human failure with fatal consequences. In an experiment a continuous 
white noise jamming waveform was emitted. This waveform caused complete 
deletion of all messages. This kind of an attack can also produce fake alarms, such 
as those an aircraft might transmit during an emergency or terrorist attack. (Infosec 
2014.) 
 
The final approach and landing are the most stressful stages of the flight for the 
flight crew. Resolving a fault in an airplane system during these phases of flight 
may set the crew to the limits of their cognitive capacity. To provide an overall 
picture of the dangers of the situation and the consequences of the incidents, a 
large amount of additional information processing capacity is required, in which 
pilots have limited availability during stressful flight phases. As a result of the 
workload, the action may become reactive, i.e. react to oncoming events as they 
occur. It is no longer possible to look at the situation holistically and to anticipate 
or plan future events. In this case, in the decision-making situation, it is easy to 
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resort to different rules of thumb created by previous experiences and be exposed 
to hallucinations. Under stress, crews do not have the resources to actively 
challenge erroneous assumptions created by biases. (Safety Investigation 
Authority 2013a.) 
 
Safety Investigation Authority of Finland (2013b) states, that aviation training 
programs must be developed in such a way that the limitations of human 
perception and decision-making ability are addressed more in teaching than at 
present. 
 
Considering different flight categories, such as instrument or visual meteorological 
conditions (IMC, VMC), each are covered by their own rules (e.g. instrument or 
visual flight rules). Some warning systems are configured to protect a certain 
condition and rule and to be suppressed in the other. The warning system can be 
activated also in the other condition and rule, but it may produce numerous false 
alarms for aircraft operating in certain circumstances. Thus, the  risk for accidents 
increases. (National Transportation Safety Board 2015.)  
 
 Railways 
The operational field of railway traffic is wide and disruptions are very complex in 
Finland. Situational information is decentralized between several different actors. 
In incident management, the challenge is that decisions are decentralized between 
different parties and actors are often dependent on each other's decisions. 
Situational information and decisions do not always meet, i.e. some actors can 
have all the information about a particular situation, but no decision-making power 
or vice versa. This contributes to making difficult to form an overall picture. All these 
challenges set requirements for situation awareness system, such as enabling all  
actors to have access to the same situational information at the same time. 
(Koistinen 2011.) 
The Safety Investigation Authority conducted a theme Investigation on wrong 
routings in train traffic in 2015 and found out, that some traffic control systems and 
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interlocking devices have functions that could be used to technically protect track 
work. However, the traffic control systems used are different and some systems 
completely lack security-related functions. The systems used for traffic 
management have undergone a constant change affecting users. This is partly due 
to the development phase of the systems, the improvements to be made to them 
and the new features to be introduced at different stages. Traffic management 
systems are being developed centrally for the use of various traffic control centers 
under the leadership of the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency. The Finnish 
Transport Agency defines, acquires and owns traffic control tools, but Finrail Oy, 
which implements traffic control, is responsible for their use. According to the 
investigation and the survey of traffic controllers, the basic features and operating 
methods of the systems have not been sufficiently understood. Traffic controllers 
are not familiar with the operation of different systems. Some of the graphical user 
interfaces of the traffic control systems were such that the possibility of a slip or 
error of a traffic controller is increased. This is affected by the monitor symbols in 
the older user interfaces and their small size as well as unclear colouring. Even 
newer interfaces may lack a marking of the location of passenger platforms at traffic 
locations. In some cases, small symbols and small text on traffic controller graphics 
screens have been affecting the incorrectly set path. Especially when the control 
areas are wide, the views of the traffic control system should be easy to interpret 
and understand. The systems should be similar for the control area entities. Many 
operating systems with different logic, even in the same workspace, increase the 
risk of errors. The characteristics of systems directly related to traffic control are 
different in traffic control centers operating in different locations and also in different 
workstations. This is due to the system vendors selected for each site and the 
investments made in different eras. The diversity of the systems has also been and 
continues to be influenced by the special features of the suppliers' own products 
and the customer's requirements related to the traffic control systems in each 
procurement. Since its introduction, changes and improvements to the systems 
have proved to be rigid in practice. Traffic controllers feel that individual faults in 
the systems are rectified quickly, but suggestions for system development and 
improvement are not taken into account. The feedback collected in the user 
experience feedback system does not progress to development measures. 
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Underlying the problem is that the development of systems often requires large 
financial resources. It also seems to be that the infrastructure manager and the 
user are different parties. (Safety Investigation Authority 2016.) 
In the short term, many other changes have also taken place, including in the 
organizational structure, regulations and guidelines. The investigation revealed 
that traffic controllers experience constant changes as stressors in their work. For 
individual workers, the whole set of changes is not necessarily outlined, but can be 
seen as fragmented and merely hampering work. Motivation to learn new 
instructions and regulations decreases. There have been delays in the completion 
of the guidelines by the Finnish Transport Agency, which means that the short time 
between the completion of the guidelines and their introduction has created 
problems in the training of traffic controllers. There have even been situations 
where the regulations in force and the regulations in use are not the same, leading 
to ambiguity as to which regulations must be complied with in practice. This also 
undermines public confidence in regulations and those who issue them. In addition, 
during the investigation, the railway traffic control manual published by the Finnish 
Transport Agency was still a confidential document. In practice, this made it difficult 
to use the handbook in a variety of ways and, for example, for self-study 
opportunities for traffic controllers. (Safety Investigation Authority 2016.) 
Within the shift, the workload is increased by track work, when the traffic controller 
is hardly able to take advantage of the automation in use, but has to work on many 
things with memory. The workload of traffic controllers is not measured very 
systematically. According to the study, automation errors are rare. The 
investigation revealed only one case where an automation error was suspected. 
This happened during the commissioning phase of the new program, when the 
automation worked unexpectedly due to a programming error. (Safety Investigation 
Authority 2016.) 
In rail transport, research on human factors has traditionally been less than in 
aviation domain. Studies show that about half of the errors are typically human 
attention errors, decreased alertness, and fatigue. However, even attention errors 
77 
 
are often caused by poor equipment design or other organizational factors. (Safety 
Investigation Authority 2016.) 
Safety incidents are recorded by several different safety authorities, but the Finnish 
Transport Infrastructure Agency is responsible for the safety of transport networks 
and statistics on safety incident data (Safety Investigation Authority 2016). 
However, deviation and incident data are not collected from an information system 
perspective, i.e. incidents related to the information system entity are not recorded 
and no public classification or taxonomy has been created for them (Safety 
Investigation Authority 2016). Deviations in information systems are equally 
possible and significant in relation to other classified anomalies, and therefore 
knowledge of them is needed to provide the most complete security picture 
possible.  
Based on the 2015 thematic study, Safety Investigation Authority ended up issuing 
a safety recommendation on reporting and classification. It is noteworthy that the 
status of the Recommendation is still “partially implemented”, so apparently this is 
a difficult and complex issue that requires a long time to implement practical 
solutions. (Safety Investigation Authority 2016.) 
The classification criteria are the EU-level common safety indicators defined in the 
Railway Safety Directive 1 and the complementary national safety indicators (VNa 
864/2010), as well as the Finnish Transport Safety Agency's (Trafi) railway safety 
indicators, which were revised in 2013 (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency 
2019b). In addition, the Association of Accident Insurance Institutions (TVL) 
classification of accidents at work (ESAW European Statistics on Accidents at 
Work) and the classification methods for accidents at work developed by Eurostat, 
the EU's statistical office, are used (Finnish Transport Agency 2014).  
Safety deviation data are compiled from several sources, such as the Finnish 
Transport Agency's safety and risk management information system, Finnish Rail 
Traffic Centre's incident reports, VR-Yhtymä Oy's railway safety reports and 
technical systems data (hot running, overload and wheel fault information). Safety 
incident reports come from one spesicif system on two different notification 
templates, incident reports as e-mails and safety reports as pdfs. The template 
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used by traffic control has taken into account the investigation of the underlying 
causes of the cases, but in the other template the identification of the underlying 
factors is challenging. However, the ultimate purpose of incident reports and 
railway safety reports is not to serve as background material for the classification 
and analysis of safety incidents, but to inform stakeholders closely. It is difficult to 
use concise and, to some extent, header-level information to identify the causes of 
deviations and to devise corrective measures. There is no separate field in the 
project template of the safety and risk management information system for 
recording culprits. The wider use of the underlying causes of safety deviations and 
development measures must take into account all the input data, as system 
changes only to the current safety and risk management information system alone 
do not cover all data. (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency 2019b.) 
Multiple incident reports are made for the same deviation and only one incident 
report is selected to describe that deviation. This choice affects the information 
available in the analysis when deviations are treated by category and some of the 
information is thus lost. The challenge also arises with deviations from different 
sources. (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency 2019b.) 
The classification criteria do not include a category for the loss of situational 
awareness, but the information related to it can be obtained from the categories of 
the safety control system issuing a false signal for the train (e.g. a clearance or an 
authorization of speed higher than allowed), of grade crossing accidents equipped 
with automatic audio or visual warning system, and of incidents caused by the third 
party for the rail system. Incorrect operation of the safety device system has not 
been reported at all in 2018 (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency 2019b). 302 
incidents caused by the third party were reported in 2017, but they comprise 
physical damage for the equipment, structures or equipment, not influencing 
attempts (e.g. malicious activity) to  systems (Finnish Transport Infrastructure 
Agency 2019a). There is no separate category for cyber threats or similar hazards. 
Regarding the unnecessary or false alarms, for example, in 2017, of the alarms of 
hot running and wheel power 508 pieces were confirmed as valid alarms and 80 
pieces (16%) were confirmed as unjustified alarms (Finnish Transport 
Infrastructure Agency 2019a).  
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As for hacking, the with new digital railway systems are estimated to expose the 
railway network to cyberattack (Khandelwal 2015), this being due to i.a. the 
European Rail Traffic Management System ERTMS and the European Train 
Control System ETCS replacing traditional signalling and offering automatic train 
protection across Europe, using wireless technology and computerised in-cab 
signals (Railway Technology 2017). In Finland, the digitalisation of rail traffic is 
progressing when the service life of train access control equipment expires at the 
end of the 2020s and EU regulations oblige to equip lines with ERTMS (Digirail 
2020). The new radio-based system is said to speed up the setting of traffic 
restrictions and promote traffic safety (Digirail 2020). The European Electricity 
Standardization Organization CENELEC is developing a cyber safety standard for 
ERTMS. Cybersecurity is being developed in cooperation with the European Cyber 
Security Agency ENISA, that together with national authorities, such as Traficom 
in Finland, will perform the system certification. (Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 2020). According to the UK Department for Transport, railway 
systems are becoming vulnerable to cyber-attack due to the shift from legacy and 
bespoke stand-alone systems to open-platform, standardised equipment built 
using commercial off the shelf components, and increasing use of networked 
control and automation systems that can be accessed remotely via public and 
private networks (Railway Technologies 2017). 
There are numerous news published of cyberattacks to railways, such as the one 
(Railway Technologies 2017) claiming that the UK rail network had been hit by at 
least four major cyber-attacks over a 12-month period in 2016. Before this, 
hackers, that estimated to be overseas, attacked computers at an unidentified 
railway company in U.S. disrupting railway signals for two days in 2012 and causing 
rail schedules to be delayed (Zetter 2012). 
In 2016 a team of researchers evaluated the level of cybersecurity implemented in 
modern railroad systems and discovered several vulnerabilities i.a. in the train 
protection system SIBAS widely adopted in Europe. The SIBAS uses the Siemens 
SIMATIC components, e.g. the WinAC RTX controller, which was affected by 
several security vulnerabilities. The team was said to be impressed by a large 
number of vulnerabilities, such as the lack of authentication protections, poor 
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maintenance, operating systems and software components not updated, and of 
hard-coded passwords. (Paganini 2016.) 
Thus, these so called traditional air-gap protected systems, such as in railways  
have been, are not immune to attacks. It remains to be seen, whether any progress 
has been made since the days of 2008, when a 14-year old teenager used a 
modified TV remote control to interfere with the tram track and point system, 
causing derailment of four vehicles and injure of 12 people (Fachot 2018). 
 
 Healthcare 
Situation awareness can be promoted with new technology. Patient monitoring 
comprises an interface between the physical quantities measured in the patient 
and the sensorium and cognition of the human decision making. The interface 
design of patient monitors does not traditionally support the human sensory 
perception, neither enabling time-effectively comprehension of the patient’s 
condition, as humans are better in recognizing shapes, colours, and movements, 
than in reading numbers. This craves high cognitive effort to integrate the 
presented information into a mental model of a patient’s current status and 
expected progression. Synthetic vision technology originates from aeronautics and 
military aviation, and is newly applied to healthcare domain. This technology 
supports situation awareness by converting numerical vital sign values and 
waveform monitoring data into a real-time virtual image as a patient avatar, and is 
expected to be useful in environments with high cognitive demand and immediate 
decision making. (Tscholl et al. 2020.) 
Technology related threats have to be considered while adapting new 
technologies. For example, regarding wireless infusion pumps, the present-time 
threats comprises targeted attacks attempting to compromise the pump and 
system components directly affecting pump operations, and advanced persistent 
threats with malware enabling a threat actor to perform unauthorized actions (NIST 
2018). In Finland, according to the National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and 
Health (Valvira), the majority (38%) of serious incidents related to medical devices 
were defects in the manufacture or design of the devices in 2009. In U.S. the public 
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Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database MAUDE database 
comprises medical device reports of device-associated deaths, injuries and 
malfunctions (FDA 2020). A search on MAUDE can be done e.g. by criteria about 
errors or failures of warning related to alarms as a product problem and a 
malfunction as an event type, this producing currently seven reports from the last 
decade (FDA 2020).  
According to the US ECRI Institute (2013) a study in a hospital environment tells 
that to 70% of alarms (n = 400 alarms) were not responded to by medical staff. Of 
the 34 significant and potentially life-threatening alarms 41% were not answered 
immediately (ECRI 2013).  
In the 2019 list of Top 10 Health Technology Hazards published by the ECRI 
Institute, the risk of brain injury and death due to incorrect alarm settings on the 
respiratory system (ventilator) was ranked fourth. Ranked in the top seven are 
improper modifications to the alarm settings of physiological monitoring devices, 
which may cause the absence of alarms. (ECRI 2018.) 
The monitoring, control and situation awareness systems must be designed and 
configured so that the operating environment achieves a balance between too 
many activated alarms and too few activated alarms to prevent alarm fatigue and 
ADT for users. Modifying alarms and their settings can help to achieve this balance. 
Modification refers to the selection of alarm thresholds and settings suitable for 
operational needs, so that an inactive state or condition is not activated and 
unnecessary alarms, i.e., missed alarms, are not generated. In the target mode, 
an activated alarm should always trigger the correct functional response. The 
system should support alarm management by enabling the editing of alarms. 
According to ECRI research, in 2018, two fatal cases were caused by incorrect 
breath minute volume and low-pressure alarm settings. (ECRI 2018.) 
The AAMI (Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation), at its 
meeting on 4-5 November 2011, identified research needs on: 
− risk analysis of what is being monitored and what is not being monitored 
− an analysis of which software, hardware and tools are causing (can cause) 
system alarms 
82 
 
− consolidate research into alert management 
− alert user response 
− the impact and effect of alarms 
− prioritization and source-specific typing of auditory alarm signal 
− to adjust the volume of the alarms according to background noise and time 
of day. 
 
There have also been some proposals as sensor alarm architectures or 
frameworks in healthcare applications of cyber-physical systems, in order to detect 
false alarms, based on various classifications of vital signs. However, they must be 
further studied and treated with caution, as sometimes their developers do not have 
the medical expertise, but the knowledge comes only from the point of view of data 
analytics. For example, due to the vast amount of versatile patient conditions, 
forms of treatment, therapeutic environments and care situations a simple and 
straightforward reasoning for algorithms of false or nuisance alarms might result to 
a safety risk.  
Kane-Gill et al. (2017) conducted a systematic literature review on alert fatigue, 
expecting to find studies evaluating systems in terms of alert fatigue. Although they 
found no such studies, they proposed a quality improvement program focused on 
appropriate alert implementation and management in order to reduce alert fatigue. 
Components of a quality improvement actions involve (1) design of alerts for 
prevention and detection of events with clear delineation of the alert purposes, (2) 
determination of the priority and clinical significance of alerts before 
implementation with organization support and alignment, (3) determination of the 
responsible responding to the alert, the mode of delivery, and a reasonable 
response time, (4) evaluation of the performance characteristics of the alerts after 
implementation, (5) revision of the alerts based on the performance characteristics, 
(6) alteration of alerts based on changes in practice, and finally (7) education and 
implementation planning to support alert introduction and expectations. 
Interventions for reducing alert fatigue in a clinical environment include prioritizing 
alerts based on severity and clinical relevance, learning from previously overridden 
alerts to avoid future alerting, focusing on atypical or rare prescribing events, taking 
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note of end user opinion in use of alerts, and customizing systems. (Kane-Gill et 
al. 2017.) 
According to Schulz et al. (2016), the majority of situation awareness errors in 
anaesthesia and critical care were the first level errors, i.e. errors in perception. 
They conducted a study on reports in the Critical Incident Reporting Systems 
(CIRS), which is an anonymous platform for voluntary reporting of errors and near 
misses in Europe, similar to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Of two hundred 
cases, situation awareness errors were identified in 163 (82%; in accordance with 
findings from aviation where the frequency of situation awareness problems in 
operational errors ranged between 59 % and 88 %). Besides the majority (38% in 
level 1), almost as much was identified in level 2, i.e. in comprehension. Only 12% 
were attributed to level 3 errors, i.e. in projection. Less errors on the level of 
perception and more errors on the levels of comprehension and projection were 
found, as a comparison to aviation. The errors can be associated with wrong 
clinical decisions, resulting in patient harm, such as a case of an anaesthesiologist 
incorrectly assuming that a drug syringe was ready to use, but in reality, drugs were 
not prepared (error in level 2, comprehension). Surprisingly, the frequency of 
situation awareness errors and their level of were independent from the location 
(e.g. Intensive Care Unit) and from other categorical data (e.g. professional status, 
work experience, routine vs. emergency case). (Schulz et al. 2016.) 
There is no publicly open database to search for hazardous incidents, but health 
care providers store notifications of incidents and near misses in their own 
systems. The most commonly used system in Finland is HaiPro, but neither it does 
record events from the perspective of loss of situational awareness. Mainly 
corresponding to situation awareness errors are the event types of communication 
and information flow (gaps in the use of available information), of operating 
methods (poor availability and comprehensibility of task-related and decision-
making information), and of work environment, tools and resources (workload, 
information system problems, deficiencies in the physical environment) (HaiPro 
2015). 
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In 2014, approximately 14000 HaiPro notifications were made at Helsinki 
University Hospital, of which 44% were near misses and 22% were incidents 
related to the flow of information. The Patient Safety Report (Helsinki University 
Hospital 2015) mentions that the inconsistent IT programs in use affected data 
processing and management. 5% of cases related to the equipment and its use 
(e.g. equipment malfunction) were recorded, which is estimated to be 
underreported. As for comparison, number of incident reports were 6341 pcs in 
2018 at Northern Ostrobothnia Hospital district, of which 41% being near misses 
(Oulu University Hospital 2018).  
The Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare collects indicators on the digitalisation 
of healthcare and the results of the 2017 information system survey for healthcare 
professionals were i.a. the following: 5% thought that system malfunction has 
caused harm (handicap), 31% thought that system malfunction has caused a risk, 
46% thought that the functions are arranged logically in the screen views, 30% 
thought that the information systems behave in an unexpected way, from 21% to 
33% thought that the information systems cause workload, 68% thought that the 
information systems displace the attention from the patient, and 69% thought that 
the terminology is clear (Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare 2019). 
Unfortunately, some of these figures are not very flattering.  
 
 Results of the database search of investigation reports 
As for this study aimed to determine about the errors related to situation 
awareness, the situation awareness levels of Endsley's model and the SHELL 
model was used. The results are illustrated in the tables below.  
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Table 3. Result tables 
 
Due to the small amount of research reports and the disproportionate distribution 
of the sample, only the sum result is shown in the Table 3 above. Thus, errors of 
situation awareness levels and interfaces are not divided into different domains. 
The results show that in a single accident, errors at different levels and at different 
interfaces can occur simultaneously. Situational awareness was most weakened 
by problems in perception (level 1), but in these reports, problems were fairly 
evenly distributed between perception, understanding and comprehension (level 
2), and projection and decision-making (level 3). Most errors were found in human-
software interactions, but almost as many in hardware-software interactions and in 
human-to-human interactions. The errors found included factors such as: 
- design errors, e.g. alarm functionality was completely missing so it could not 
be communicated at all, meaning that the initial information was already 
incomplete 
- design errors, e.g. unclear or inadequate visualization of alarms 
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- system operating limitations, e.g. configuration errors of alarm parameters 
or lack of system interoperability 
- system failures, e.g. a device (sensor) had stopped working, or an alarm 
message was not visualized, or different systems gave conflicting alarms or 
warnings 
- misinterpretation or ignorance of the situation 
- performance deficits or errors due to situational pressures, cognitive 
workload or inadequate instructions and operating procedures 
- deliberate operative errors, e.g. disregard for warnings (resetting, 
suppressing or shelving) and lack of cooperation between the central control 
and the local operator 
- unintentional operative errors due to the problem of perception and 
detecting alarms, unresponsiveness to warnings, or missing cross-checks 
as verification mechanism 
- general negligence or lack of competence caused by an inadequate safety 
culture. 
The results support the conception of the literature review of this study brought out 
about the Human Factor and the importance of user interfaces to security. These 
results providing only a rough picture, it is justified to propose a more detailed 
analysis of the research material in order to increase the reliability of the study. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study was to investigate how situational awareness systems can 
implement situational awareness through visual usability in user information, and 
to consider the risks associated with the reliability, integrity and availability of 
situation information through user interface, and impact of this information on user 
decision making. The focus of situation information was on alarms using a derived 
theoretical research assumption of a malicious attacker causing alert fatigue and  
loss of situational awareness by triggering unnecessary or false alarms, or by 
influencing to alarm data otherwise. The study succeeded in achieving the learning 
objective. 
The answers to the first research question (1a and 1b) were presented in Chapters 
2 and 3. This study demonstrated that understanding of human cognitive functions 
is essential in situation awareness. These functions are represented in theoretical 
models of situation awareness, for example, in Endsley’s model, as well as in 
SHELL-model. Interactions between people, programs, systems and devices must 
work flawlessly to meet the requirements of cybersecurity within the field of 
information exchange in every level of situation awareness. Nowadays, information 
systems are wide-ranging compositions and configurations providing several 
functionalities and utilizing multiple information sources. Human expertise and 
knowledge is integrated as properties in order to maintain goal-orientation, control 
and supervision for continuous developing. Robustness and resilience are 
obtained through parallel data collection and analysation methods. The design of 
user interaction in situation awareness systems is supported with multiple 
instruments, such as design guides and standards. These instruments promote the 
situation awareness of a user in the context of alarm functionalities by offering both 
general as well as domain-specific guidelines for appropriate and safe design and 
implementation. Guides and standards are widely applied in safety critical 
industries, for example, in nuclear industry and aviation domain, serving as 
bywords for other domains.  
The answers to the second (2a and 2b) research questions were presented in 
Chapter 5. To conclude these findings, a short synthesis is introduced herein. As 
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stated in the very beginning of this study, the loss of situational awareness might 
lead to severe and fatal accidents. The factors of these accidents are manifold and 
thus, situation awareness has also been lost for a number of reasons, instead of 
only one particular reason. Accident and investigation reports show that the causes 
have mostly been a sum of many factors, such as a human error combined with a 
hardware or software failure and a communication defect. In practice, 
misconfiguration causes misinformation and leads to misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation. Several reports indicated that the lack of alarm functionality in 
the systems causes misperception leading to misinterpretation of the situation, 
which in turn contributes to a human malfunction at the situational awareness level 
2 (understanding) and 3 (anticipation, projection), resulting finally in incorrect 
decisions in mental pressure situations. These public reports are widely available 
and accessible, and especially in the field of aviation numerous reports in various 
databases of the situation awareness loss can be found. On the contrary, alarm-
related events were estimated to be underreported especially in healthcare 
domain. Besides this, the loss of situation awareness is not usually classified as a 
category of its own in taxonomies of databases or accident criteria, but the reports 
related to it can be searched by using it or its compound for a key word. False 
alarms or cyber-attacks related to them are not classified at all in these databases. 
Indeed, the need to develop a classification has been identified herein. For the time 
being, the interpretation of the reports requires careful reading in order for the 
conclusions to be correct. 
As for an example of incident reporting, The Federal Aviation Administration has 
developed the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing ASIAS system, 
which enables users to perform integrated queries across multiple databases.  
However, conducting a search in World Aircraft Accident Summary WAAS, FAA 
strongly instructs (2020), that considerable care and caution when interpreting the 
meaning of the data should be exercised, due to a number of definitional and 
statistical problems. Signifying, that interpretation of the data can result in 
misleading and erroneous conclusions, when the data is used as a measure of 
safety performance, especially in evaluating individual airline safety performance. 
This also indicates the existence of reporting problems. 
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The answers to the third research questions (3a and 3b) were presented in Chapter 
4. As indicated previously, failures in attention are a frequently cited reason for 
accidents. A misplaced, or a dominant or latent source of information, such as a 
flashing warning message wrongly configured and prioritised, can be a distraction 
from the formation of situational awareness. Information overload due to alarms 
produced by a large number of technological devices and systems predisposes 
humans to excessive workload leading to alert fatigue and Attention Deficit Trait 
disorders. This is especially relevant in the healthcare domain, where the major 
contributing factors to losing situation awareness were stated to be inadequacy of 
an alarm system or its settings or integrations, or quality of alarms, all these 
contributing to alarm fatigue. On the other hand, high levels of automation 
combined with perceived excessive comfort in the work environment and a low 
level of human activation and participation can also weaken situation awareness. 
Finally, malicious and criminal activity in the form of attacks against critical systems 
can take place resulting to a loss of correct and actual situation picture. These 
attacks are performed by using various techniques, such as data manipulation or 
signal spoofing, in order to generate false alarms. Although the alarm functions 
must be designed to minimize the effects of false and nuisance alerts by preventing 
the presentation of an inappropriate or unnecessary alert, it has been proved that 
by hacking an alarm system, creation of a wrong situational picture is possible. As 
an example of that was the turning on of 156 emergency sirens for about two hours 
in Dallas 2017 (Khandelwal 2018), and similar events have even occurred after 
that. Another alarm-related incident was the Hawaii false missile alert in 2018 
(Cohen 2018), which occurred by reason of insufficient management controls, poor 
computer software design, and human factors. This false alert had many 
undesirable consequences, such as people rushing overspeed to seek shelter, 
authority offices inundated with phone calls, jammed data services, and even a 
death of a person caused by a heart-attack due to fear. These events have also 
had positive effects in the form of policy and procedure reviews and updates, 
aiming to avoid false and nuisance alarms. The effects include corrections and 
patching of system weaknesses and vulnerabilities as well, so that exploitation of 
those would no longer be possible.  
90 
 
Furthermore, the research material showed that there are shortcomings in various 
situation awareness systems, especially in traffic management. For example, in an 
air traffic control system, an air traffic controller could not properly separate snow 
machines from aircraft, or runways due to deficiencies in vehicle detectors. The 
system was subsequently developed so that airplanes and land vehicles were 
clearly distinguishable on the screen. Development work had been done for a long 
time, but the system implementation had to be postponed, i.e. because of the 
biases and conflicts in object identification. (Safety Investigation Authority 2018b.) 
With respect to described above, it should not be overlooked the fact of situation 
awareness loss often resulting from inappropriate design of information systems. 
There is a lack of utilizing Design Science and Human Factors, as the focus being 
on sheer Information Engineering and solely on technical elements (except on 
aviation domain, being a forerunner on many things). As Naderpour et al. (2015) 
stated, well understood hardware reliability techniques contributes to that, whereas 
the handling of human factors is experienced as difficult and costly to be taken into 
attention in system and software development. This as in respect to previously 
indicated growing need of cognitive decision support systems. Continuing on the 
issues that Naderpour et al. (2015) indicated, there is also room for improvement 
on to what extent humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and 
form, or explanations of system functioning, or observations of system states, and 
predictions of future states. This is a question of a mental model, being treated as 
default or base information before forming a higher level of situation awareness. 
(Naderpour et al. 2015.) 
Related to the demands of an end user and the experience of how the system 
supports the work, the Quality of Service concept could be used as a tool in system 
development. This supports the idea of Endsley & Robertson (Endsley 2000), 
according to which, in order to discover possible methods for improving situation 
awareness is to observe in what conditions and how situation awareness errors 
occur, or to identify situations when individuals are able to develop and maintain 
situation awareness. Effective monitoring and cross-checking can be the last line 
of defence that prevents an accident, because detecting an error or unsafe 
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situation may break the chain of events leading to an accident (National 
Transportation Safety Board 2014).  
Maintaining situation awareness and avoiding false alarms requires systems 
thinking, familiar with safety sciences. Cognitive work and task analysis methods, 
such as Critical Decision Method (CDM) for analysis of special and unusual events, 
developed in the field of cognitive ergonomics can be utilized to analyse work and 
work processes. The operational safety of systems is promoted by applying and 
simulating human cognition and the functioning of natural ecosystems. As stated 
previously, a human error should be considered as a symptom of the system and 
its design. This is true in the Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process 
STAMP and its predictive risk assessment method, System-Theoretic Process 
Analysis STPA, which can be used for hazard and accident analysis in complex 
systems (Leveson and Thomas 2018). Another useful framework is the Emergency 
Response Protocol developed by EU to improve cyber preparedness. This 
framework introduces the phases of early detection and identification, threat 
classification, emergency response coordination, early warning notification, 
operational action plan, investigation and analysis, and emergency response 
protocol closure for a major cyber-attack in the cybersecurity ecosystem (IOCTA 
2019).  
For the improvement of situation awareness, there are multiple methods for 
conducting situational assessments analysis, including measurements based on 
observation of on-going activities i.e. process indices and performance measures 
(e.g., WOMBAT and SABARS), or direct measurements i.e. think aloud technique 
and real-time probes and freezing techniques (e.g., SAGAT), or retrospective 
measurement techniques (e.g., SARS), or team situation awareness 
measurements (e.g., CARS) (Human Factors Methods 2020). 
Regarding the development of technology, although it was previously stated that 
researchers are currently developing more pleasant, quieter, and more informative 
alert methods to prevent i.a. alert fatigue, will this not be sufficient to inhibit all alert-
related hazards. There is going to be a hurry, if the estimation of quantum 
computing ending the effectiveness of currently used encryption methods within 
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the next five years proves to be true, especially if the criminal use of artificial 
intelligence increases at the same time (IOCTA 2019). It also remains to be seen, 
how e.g. 9D technologies or virtual, mixed and augmented reality offers 
possibilities by changing perception based on our five senses. Capturing user’s 
focus can be done through sense of sight, hearing, touch, or even taste or smell, 
all in a whole new kind of cyber environment.  
Artificial intelligence solutions are constantly evolving. Utilization of artificial 
intelligence for situational awareness requires the definition of perception and the 
solution of related means in order to automate situational imaging systems. 
Situational awareness artificial intelligence research focuses on i.a. research into 
human-machine interaction, the areas of which include e.g. ergonomics, data and 
information visualization, and perceptual psychology. The most significant in the 
development of technologies related to perception are i.a. machine vision and 
image analysis, radars (radio-frequency, Lidar), ultrasound (radars), natural 
language analysis, voice and speech, positioning and tactile. When developing 
artificial intelligence technologies, the utilization of other disciplines and methods 
and the combination of data-based and symbolic artificial intelligence methods are 
central from the perspective of the system level and system effects. Perhaps most 
important, however, is the emphasis on a better understanding of biological 
systems and natural intelligence. (Ailisto et al. 2018.)  
This study sought to indicate situational awareness risks in the context of alarm 
systems entity in order to prevent adverse effects such as accidents. Reading the 
narrative investigation reports is subject to interpretation, as it is according to 
hermeneutical research method. Therefore, the same research material can 
provide other points of view as well. This affects to the reliability of the study, but 
on the other hand opens up opportunities for new syntheses. The author expected 
to see evidence of false alarms (i.a. as a malicious activity) causing hazardous 
events in report databases, but had to settle for few news and theoretical research 
articles. 
Topics for further research were identified in this study, the most significant of them 
being a development of taxonomy for situation awareness systems security 
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incidents as the factor of accidents and hazardous events. Security incidents are 
recorded by several different security authorities, but the incident information is not 
recorded from an information system perspective, i.e. incidents related to the 
information system entity are not recorded, and no public classification has been 
created for them, at least in Finland. Exceptions related to information systems are 
equally possible and significant in relation to other classified anomalies, and 
therefore knowledge of them is needed to provide the most complete security 
picture possible. Here it would be possible to utilize exception handling and event 
management concepts. The second most significant topic is proposed to be an 
execution of a detailed analysis of the causes of false alarms and development of 
preventive measures and alarm management as a case study. The third most 
significant topic would be an empirical research on the application of different 
theoretical models and frameworks to improve situational awareness and develop 
a safety culture in the organization. 
Situation awareness as a topic is always current providing many possibilities for 
study. This is also reflected in the fact that on November 18 2019, Yle (Nyyssönen 
2019) reported on testing new technologies developed for government use in the 
Toxi Triage project, which develops CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiation and 
Nuclear) rescue, treatment and incident management. The objective is to speed 
up the identification and response of the nature and extent of the hazard and the 
achievement of situational awareness by reducing the assessment time to less 
than five minutes in order to improve protection and survival (Toxi Triage 
18.11.2019). 
In the same interview by Yle, Project Manager Jaana Kuula from the Faculty of 
Information Technology at the University of Jyväskylä states that new technologies 
bring extensions to the human senses and physical abilities. He goes on to say 
that technology has great potential for improving people's safety. Technology plays 
an important role in intelligence, situational awareness and sharing, and new types 
of security technologies are being developed at universities and companies. Jaana 
Kuula explains that the starting point is to better protect the society from various 
threats in the future, and here understanding the situation facilitates decision-
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making and gives people security, completes Jyri Silmäri, the rescue manager of 
the South Savo Rescue Department. (Nyyssönen 2019.) 
The loss of situation awareness has significance in each level, from individual 
human level, organization level, system level, up to society level. It is justified to 
state that situation awareness cannot afford being lost. If the amount of accidents 
and incidents keep on increasing, the trust in situation awareness systems tend to 
weaken and the security, usability and effectiveness will no longer be at required 
level. Also, a user should be able to trust to an alert generated by the system, as 
in the same way the public needs to be able to trust that when a government issues 
an alert it is indeed a credible alert.  
Regarding global situation awareness, Multinational Experiment 7 (MNE7) was an 
international co-operation pilot project conducted in the early 2010s that focused 
on the use of global operating environments - seas, airspace, space and global 
information networks - and defined situational awareness according to Endsley 
(Kuusisto 2014). In this project structures, roles, processes and tool requirements 
for gaining and maintaining effective situation awareness in cyberspace were 
defined. The Cyber Situational Awareness was defined as the perception of 
environmental elements with respect to time and/or space, the comprehension of 
their meaning, and the projection of their status after some variable has changed, 
such as time. Definition continues, that situational awareness involves being aware 
of what is happening in the vicinity to understand how data and information, 
network events, and SOCs’ own actions will affect goals and objectives, both 
immediately and in the near future. (MNE7 2013.) 
Finally, a good start point is definition of an alarm philosophy, as described in 
ANSI/ISA-18.2-2009, that serves as the framework to establish the criteria, 
definitions and principles for the alarm lifecycle stages by specifying items including 
the methods for alarm identification, rationalization, classification, prioritization, 
monitoring, management of change, and audit to be followed. Recent technological 
instruments, such as machine learning algorithms that are nowadays 
commercialized as services, can be utilized. Most of all, users’ workflows and 
information needs should be considered, suppliers ought to be educated and the 
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user-centric design required. Like Lehto stated 2019, when building a solution, a 
balance must be found between cybersecurity, system functionality, and user 
experience. Inappropriate solutions in functionality and convenience create a very 
high degree of vulnerability within the organization. This is the groundwork for the 
protection of the critical infrastructure.  
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